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Constitutionalism and International
Organizations
Ernst- Ulrich Petersmann *
Peaceful cooperation among individuals and among states has be-
come a globally recognized policy objective. The worldwide trend to-
wards deregulation, market economies, protection of human rights
and democracies reflects an increasing recognition that individual
freedom, non-discrimination and rule of law are the best conditions
for promoting individual and collective self-determination and social
welfare. But in contrast to the long-standing constitutional theories
for national democracies, there is a troubling paucity of theory on how
to achieve a peaceful international order based on worldwide liberal
rules. During the first half of the 20th century, government policies in
international relations continued to be dominated by power politics,
protectionism and pragmatic trial and error with tragic experiences of
government failures, such as wars and unnecessary widespread
poverty.
The disappearance of the cold war international system and the
emergence of market-oriented global integration have created new
opportunities for the establishment of a liberal international order
based on principles of constitutionalism and democracy. However,
traditional democratic theories offer little guidance for achieving a lib-
eral global order, or for reforming the outdated UN system, due to
their one-sided focus on nation states and on the challenges to democ-
racy that emerge within national boundaries.' European integration
law and theory have likewise focused on the domestic policy constitu-
* Professor of Law at the University of St. Gallen and at the Geneva Graduate Institute of
International Studies. Legal adviser in the GATT and WTO (1981-1996) and, previously, in the
German Ministry of Economic Affairs (1978-1981).
1 DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THm GLOBAL ORDER 99-136 (1995).
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tion and common market law of the European Union (EU). Due to
the lack of a corresponding foreign policy constitution, the discretion-
ary foreign policy powers of the EU have, so far, not been effectively
constitutionalized. Therefore, the external relations law of the EC
continues to be dominated in many areas by power-oriented rather
than rights-based paradigms.' The constitutionalization of EC law in
the case law of the EC Court of Justice and the enlargement of the
EU to 15, and soon more than 20, member states are progressively
extending the supra-national EC guarantees of free trade, rule of law,
fundamental rights, judicial review and democracy throughout
Europe.
I. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: A MODEL FOR REFORMING
THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER?
International economic law continues to provide the core of Eu-
ropean integration law and has moved to the centre of foreign policy-
making. It has become one of the most important foreign policy in-
struments for promoting not only economic welfare but also individ-
ual freedom and rule of law. Some of the paradigms of modem
international economic law - such as the protection of individual
property rights through a compulsory system of third-party "adjudica-
tion and appellate review in the 1994 Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization (WTO) and the progressive overcoming of
the outdated distinctions between the external law and internal law of
states in European integration - could offer models for reforming in-
ternational relations in other areas as well.3 This exemplary function
of liberal international economic rules seems to confirm the long-
standing emphasis in political philosophy (e.g., of I. Kant and D.
Hume) and economic theory (e.g., of D. Ricardo and A. Smith) that
the mutual gains from voluntary international trade, and from an in-
ternational division of labour based on liberal rules, offer the most
important means to overcome the "Hobbesian war of everybody
against everybody else" through peaceful cooperation, even if people
and governments act as self-interested utility-maximizers.
2 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Proposals for a New Constitution for the European Union:
Building-Blocks for a Constitutional Theory and Constitutional Law of the EU, 32 COMMON
MKr. L. REv. 1123, 1170-72 (1995); idem, The External Powers of the Community and the Union:
Proposals for Protecting the Interests of EU Citizens, in THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION:
SuGGESTONS FOR REVISION, 265-77 (Asser Instituut, 1996).
3 See Joel P. Trachtman, The International Economic Law Revolution, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 33 (1996).
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. International lawyers, even if aware of the serious limitations of
the state-centered Westphalian system of classic international law and
of the inadequacies of the inter-governmental UN system for main-
taining democratic peace, often fail to understand the economic logic
and moral foundations of international economic law and its systemic
significance for a peaceful international order. Market institutions are
an indispensable complement of human rights for promoting individ-
ual autonomy and human well-being in a vital part of everybody's life
(e.g., as student, producer and consumer). Economic law is a neces-
sary precondition for the proper functioning of markets and for avoid-
ing both market failures as well as government failures. The post-war
transformation of the anarchic "international law of coexistence" into
a peaceful "international law of cooperation" has been most success-
ful in the realm of international economic law and European intega-
tion law with its supra-national guarantees of individual freedom,
legal equality, democratic participation and rule of law. Thus, there is
no reason for general international lawyers to neglect international
economic law as an allegedly "immature specialization."
Nor is there a reason for immature legal generalizations in the
field of international economic law because, due to governments' in-
sistence on reciprocity, general international law rules have become
largely supplanted by treaty law in international economic relations.
The transnational exercise and legal protection of individual freedoms
.and the judicial settlement of disputes appear today more developed
and more effective in regional and worldwide economic law than in
most traditional areas of international law, which are still dominated
by the mediation of citizen interests through government bureaucra-
cies.4 Since most people spend most of their time on the production
of goods and services (such as education) as a means to acquire other
goods and services inside and outside their home country, the fre-
quent double standard cultivated by many lawyers and courts (that is,
their preference for, and higher level of scrutiny accorded to, civil and
political rights rather than to economic and social rights, and their dis-
regard of the increasingly transnational exercise of individual rights in
the modern global economy) reflects a strange legal anachronism and
disregard of the actual individual preferences of the modern homo
economicus.
If the benevolent government assumption were true, e.g., that gov-
ernments maximize the public interest of their citizens, a liberal trade
4 See ERNST-ULRICH PETERMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAw 375-461 (1991).
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order should emerge spontaneously pursuant to the today worldwide
economic insight that trade liberalization tends to maximize consumer
welfare by enabling citizens to buy more, better and cheaper goods
and services in the best markets. Trade liberalization also promotes
competition, investment, innovation and monetary and price stability,
and it limits abuses of power. Why is it then that for centuries the
foreign policies of most countries have been dominated by power-ori-
ented, welfare-reducing protectionism and other government failures?
Why did it take more than eight years to conclude the Uruguay
Round of multilateral trade negotiations (1986-1994) and to replace
the old "GATT 1947" by the 1994 WTO Agreement? 5 Why does the
WTO Agreement include a large number of references to other
worldwide and regional agreements, such as the UN Charter, the
Agreement establishing the International Monetary Fund, as well as
international commodity agreements, international environmental
agreements, international agreements on technical regulations and
services trade (such as the International Telecommunications Union,
air transport and shipping agreements), international agreements on
the protection of intellectual property rights and regional free-trade
and customs union agreements like the EC? What are the legal conse-
quences of meshing international regimes, with numerous references
to individual rights (such as intellectual property rights) and individual
access to domestic courts, for the interpretation of WTO law in inter-
national and domestic dispute settlement proceedings? How should
national and international policy-making processes be regulated and
controlled so as to more effectively protect the equal liberties and
democratic rights of domestic citizens against power politics and
"rent-seeking?" What can we learn from the WTO Agreement for
reforming the UN Charter and for "constitutionalizing" foreign policy
powers so as to better entrench human rights and democratic peace
for the benefit of individual citizens?
5 For a survey and analysis of the Uruguay Round negotiations see J. Croome, Reshaping
the World Trading System - A History of the Uruguay Round, WTO 1995; Erst-Ulrich
Petersmann, The Transformation of the World Trading System through the 1994 Agreement Es-
tablishing the World Trade Organization, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 161, 215-21 (1995); THE NEW GATT
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 501-77 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Mein-
hard Hilf eds., 2d ed. 1991). For a systematic analysis of the Uruguay Round Agreements see
THE URUGUAY ROUND RESULTS, A EUROPEAN LAWYERS' PERsPECnIvE (Bourgeois et al. eds.,
1995); BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHAEL KosrEcKi, TIE POLITICAL ECONOIY OF THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: FROM GAIT TO WTO 169-71 (1995); JoHN H. JACKSON Er AL,
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 1118-26 (3d ed. 1995); THE NEW
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (OECD, 1995).
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II. LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER: TaE NEED FOR RULES AND
ORGANIZATIONS
How can we achieve peaceful cooperation among more than five
billion individuals in about two hundred sovereign states, and main-
tain full respect for their equal human rights, their "sovereign equal-
ity" and for our "constitutional ignorance" (von Hayek) of their
constantly changing individual preferences and plans? History and
constitutional theory teach that national order and international order
require three different kinds of rules to solve the "coordination
problems," "organization problems" and "constitutional problems" of
national and international societies (See Table 1):
A. Transaction Law
There is,first, a need for general rules (e.g., on freedoms, property
rights, legal equality and contract law) to enable voluntary transac-
tions among individuals as well as among states (such as liberal trade)
and to promote "spontaneous decentralized order." Without such
rules and decentralized transaction law, the conflicts among the short-
term interests of individuals risk endangering their common long-term
interests, thus leading to a "Hobbesian war of everybody against eve-
rybody else." International trade and international trade law, for in-
stance, have emerged spontaneously wherever economic liberty,
property rights, legal equality, contract law and arbitration were pro-
tected through general rules.6 But it is also a common experience of
national and international legal systems that the "Hobbesian di-
lemma" is difficult to overcome due to the "prisoners dilemma" of co-
operation. Even if rules are recognized as a necessary precondition
for mutually beneficial cooperation, voluntary agreement on national
and international rules may not come about if citizens and govern-
ments focus on their short-term self-interests (e.g., in "free-riding"
and circumventing general rules) rather than on their common long-
term interests (e.g., in rule of law and liberal trade). The social "coor-
dination problem" is further complicated by the fact that general rules
and self-interested utility maximization by the homo economicus also
give rise to "spontaneous disorder," such as abuses of private market
power, pollution of the environment and, at the intergovernmental
level, power politics and mutually impoverishing protectionism.
Peaceful cooperation therefore requires solutions also to the following
6 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Principles of World Trade, 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PuB. INT'L L.
530 (1981).
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Table 1: Constitutional Problems of Social Order
Kinds of Order National Order International Order
Coordination Problems: "Hobbes' Dilemma" "International Anarchy"
(conflicts of short-term ("beggar-my-neighbour
interests) policies")
General rules on General Rules (e.g., General "International
freedoms, property freedoms, property Law of Coexistence" (e.g.,
rights, equality and rights and other rules "sovereign equality of
contract law enabling reflecting common states," reciprocity, human
agreed transactions and long-term interests) rights)
"spontaneous order" . 4.
"spontaneous Spontaneous order (e.g.,
decentralized order" balance of power and
(e.g., markets) "self-help" systems,
international division of
labour)
(Transaction Law) 4 4
"market failures" and "Market failures" and
spontaneous disorder "government failures"
(e.g., pollution) (e.g., wars, mercantilism)
Organization Problems: Organizations are International
necessary Organizations are
necessary
"Result-oriented" rules, a) to limit "market a) to limit transnational
procedures and failures" such as: "market failures" such as
organizations with - abuses of power - abuses of power
legislative, - pursuit of short- - pursuit of short-term
administrative and term self-interests with self-interests with adverse
judicial functions adverse "external "external effects"
effects"
b) to supply "public b) to supply "international
goods" (e.g., legal public goods," and
security and
information), and




Constitutional Constitutional "Kant's Imperative:"
Problems: restraints (e.g., Perpetual Peace requires
fundamental rights, international rule of law
objective principles of principles among states





Long-term rules of a "Locke's Dilemma" Inadequate supply of
higher legal rank (inadequate "international public
enabling "constitutional constitutional restraints goods" ("constitutional
order" on foreign policy failures")
powers, asymmetries in
(Constitutional Law) information and in
foreign policymaking)
coordination problems: How to induce individuals and governments
to cooperate and agree on rules that protect the equal freedoms of
individuals and of their governments, and to promote welfare and se-
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curity through mutually beneficial cooperation? How to prevent in-
ternational anarchy in a decentralized international system based on
self-help (Article 51 of the UN Charter) and discretionary, power-ori-
ented foreign policies? How to counteract the risks of "market imper-
fections" and "spontaneous disorder" (e.g., in the case of pollution)?
B. Organization Law
These latter challenges call for result-oriented rules, procedures
and organizations so as to limit market failures (such as abuses of eco-
nomic power and market-distorting "external effects") and to supply
public goods that are not secured through spontaneous market mecha-
nisms (such as legal security and "social justice"). But how should
such organizations be designed so as to avoid inefficient bureaucracies
and "government failures" (such as protectionist abuses of regulatory
powers) which might be worse than "market failures?" To what ex-
tent do citizens and their governments need international organiza-
tions for the supply of international public goods and for the effective
control of transnational market failures? Is it still justified that the
post-war international organizations focus more on the limitation of
"government failures" (such as governmental restrictions of liberal
trade and of human rights) than on anti-competitive business prac-
tices? Are there convincing reasons for the traditional refusal by gov-
ernment bureaucracies to recognize individual citizens as direct
subjects of public international law, and for the paternalistic media-
tion of private interests through their governments? How can the
public interest be known and legitimately defined if the equal rights of
domestic citizens, and their possibility to freely express their individ-
ual preferences in the economic and "political markets," are not effec-
tively protected? Is the traditional distinction between national law,
whose rules can be directly invoked and enforced by domestic citizens
through national courts, and international law, whose rules are often
declared by governments to be "not directly applicable," in the inter-
est of domestic citizens? What are the optimal relationships between
integration goals, international institutions and domestic law recep-
tion of international law? How should legislative, executive and judi-
cial competences be allocated so as to better protect the transnational
exercise of individual rights and limit abuses of international regula-
tory powers?
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C. Constitutional Law
The risks of government failures and transnational market fail-
ures call for long-term constitutional rules of a higher legal rank so as
to protect the equal rights of the citizens against abuses of post-consti-
tutional, current policy-making processes and regulatory powers. The
modern evolution of human rights into worldwide treaty and custom-
ary law implies that all governments are bound to protect the dignity,
liberty, legal equality and other basic rights of their citizens. The
guarantees of political liberties in worldwide and regional human
rights conventions, such as the right of every citizen "[t]o take part in
the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen repre-
sentatives"' 7 so that "[t]he will of the people shall be the basis of the
authority of government,"8 require democratic institutions protecting
the basic rights of all citizens from abuses of government power, in-
cluding abuses supported by a majority or by non-democratic govern-
ments that do not respect the democratic right of self-determination.9
Also, outside the area of international human rights law, most world-
wide international agreements (such as GATT and the WTO Agree-
ment) serve "constitutional functions" by protecting freedom, non-
discrimination, rule of law and judicial protection of individual rights
across frontiers. The transition from an international order based on
hegemonic power (notably of the permanent members of the UN Se-
curity Council) to the "international rule of law"'1 and the emerging
right to democratic governance" are, however, still-continuing and
fragile developments.
7 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 25, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), also guarantees the right
of every citizen "[t]o vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression
of the will of the electors."
8 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd.
Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A1810 (1948), reprinted in Djonvich, 2 United Nations Resolutions 139
(Series No. 1, 1973).
9 On the need of developing international law in pro-democratic directions, including some
form of collective democratic security, see JAMES CRAW7oRD, DEMOCRACY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1994).
10 On the distinction between "rules of law" and "the Rule of Law," and the requirements
for the international rule of law, see Arthur Watts, The International Rule of Law, 36 GERMAN
Y.B. INTr' L. 15 (1993).
11 Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46
(1992).
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D. Need for a Constitutional Theory of International Relations
From a human rights perspective, governments derive their legiti-
macy from essentially three sources: (1) the protection of the equal
rights of their citizens; (2) democratic decision-making by the people
and their freely elected representatives; and (3) the welfare-increasing
results of democratic policy-making."2 A rights-based conception of
representative democracy is firmly rooted in moral philosophy (such
as Immanuel Kant's "categorical imperative") and legal principles of
justice (such as John Rawls' theory of justice).' 3 It is also vindicated
by utilitarian economic and political theories and empirical evidence.
Economic theory, for instance, emphasizes that individual liberties
and actionable property rights are preconditions for the proper func-
tioning of economic and political markets, and for the maximization of
individual autonomy, human well-being, economic efficiency and so-
cial welfare in a free society.14 Political theory and historical experi-
ence (e.g., in the context of EC law and of the European Convention
on Human Rights) confirm that granting actionable rights to self-in-
terested citizens offers the most effective incentives for a self-enforc-
ing liberal constitution. For a variety of reasons, periodically elected
governments often cannot act as neutral maximizers of the public in-
terest. Since most people earn their income as a producer in a specific
area but spend their income on thousands of different products and
services, it is rational for them to concentrate on their producer inter-
ests; hence, in all societies, producer interests tend to be more organ-
ized and politically influential than dispersed consumer interests.
Governments depend on political support and accommodate interest
12 Cf. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Moral Foundations of the European Union's Foreign
Policy Constitution: Defining 'European Identity' and 'Community Interests' for the Benefit of
EU Citizens, 51 AuSSENWRTScHAFr [Swiss REv. INT'L ECON. REL.] 151 (1996).
13 See the first of the "two principles of justice" developed in Jon RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JusTncs 136-41 (1973): "[E]ach person is to-have an equal right to the most extensive basic
liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others." Id. at 60.
14 See GEOFFREY BRENN'AN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE REASON OF RULES (1985). James
Buchanan's comparison of John Rawls' theory of justice and Adam Smith's theory of natural
liberty concludes that Rawls' "first principle,." supra note 13 and Smith's principle of natural
liberty are "substantially equivalent," apart from the fact that Rawls puts the emphasis on polit-
ical freedom, whereas Smith focuses on economic freedom; cf. James M. Buchanan, The Justice
of Natural Liberty, in ADAM SMrr AND MODERN POLrICAL ECONOMY 124 (G. Driscoll ed.,
1979) ("Particular interferences that would .. .be classified as 'unjust' by Rawlsian criteria
would correspond very closely to those Smith classified in the same way."). On the function of
market mechanisms to promote individual freedoms (such as decisional autonomy and substan-
tive opportunities to choose) see Amartya Sen, Markets and Freedoms: Achievements and Limi-
tations of the Market Mechanism in Promoting Individual Freedoms, 45 OxFoRD ECON. PAPERS
519, 520 (1993).
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group pressures. The asymmetries in the organization and political
influence of interest groups represent a permanent threat to the equal
rights of domestic citizens. They call for constitutional safeguards en-
abling the citizens to defend their individual rights and protect their
long-term general interests (e.g., in equal liberties, democratic deci-
sion-making, due process of law and "social justice").
Empirical research into the relationship between economic free-
dom and economic growth of 102 countries over the period 1975-1995
has confirmed that the more economic freedom a country has had, the
more economic growth it has achieved and the richer its citizens have
become. 15 Thus, the fact that the average per capita income of, for
example, Singapore, increased from about 500 U.S. dollars in 1965 to
more than 25,000 dollars in 1995, whereas the per capita income of
some African developing countries stagnated during the same 30 year
period, seems, in large part, due to the respective government policies.
Conflict researchers of wars over the last 200 years have also con-
firmed that democracies tend to resolve their conflicts of interests
peacefully and hardly ever wage war on each other. 16 One of Imman-
uel Kant's prescriptions for perpetual peace, that "the Civil Constitu-
tion . . . shall in every State be Republican" because rights-based
democracies tend to promote rule of law and peaceful settlement of
disputes not only at home but also in their external relations, thus
appears to have been validated.' 7
Yet, even if the need for national and international rules and or-
ganizations to deal with the various coordination, organization and
constitutional problems of a liberal international order has been recog-
nized, we still lack a constitutional theory on the optimal relationships
between the national and international rules and organizations. For
instance: How can agreement on legal restraints of the traditional
"primacy of foreign policy" and broad foreign policy discretion be
reached? To what extent should foreign policy powers and interna-
tional organizations be limited by constitutional principles of rule-of-
law and judicial protection of individual rights? How can interna-
tional rule-making and the administrative powers of international or-
ganizations be prevented from undermining domestic democracies
15 See JAMES GWARTNEY ET AL, ECONoNC FREEDOM OF THE WORM: 1975-1995 (1996).
Of course, the empirical correlation between economic freedom and wealth does not prove cau-
sation, and the measurement of governmental restrictions on "economic freedom" raises difficult
normative and empirical problems.
16 See Erich Weede, Some Simple Calculations on Democracy and War Involvement, 29 J.
PEACE REs. 377, 382 (1992).
17 MICHAEL HowARD, WAR AND THE LIBERAL CONSrSENcE 27, 6-7 (1978).
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and political accountability? Should worldwide, regional and national
economic institutions be coordinated by means of intergovernmental
policy coordination or rather by means of decentralized "competition
among governments?"18 Should individual citizens be entitled to in-
yoke and enforce international guarantees of freedom and non-dis-
crimination (such as those in GATT/WTO and EC law) in domestic
courts? 19 Neither the constitutional theories nor the constitutional
traditions in the various countries of the world seem to offer clear
answers to these questions.
III. THREE DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING
AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW
A. Need for Constitutional Restraints on Foreign Policy Powers
For a number of economic, political and legal reasons, foreign
policy powers are among the most dangerous powers of governments.
For example:
1. Foreign Policy as Income Redistribution
Economic theory teaches that trade restrictions and many other
foreign policy measures operate by taxing and restricting domestic cit-
izens, and by redistributing income among domestic groups, in a sur-
reptitious and welfare-reducing manner.20 An import tariff, for
instance, entails not only higher prices, fewer products and less free-
dom of choice for domestic consumers, but also redistributes income
by enabling import-competing producers to exploit domestic consum-
ers through "protection rents" at considerable "deadweight costs" for
the domestic economy (e.g., due to inefficient import substitution).
While liberal trade rules benefit all consumers, import protection ben-
efits only a few import-competing producers at the expense of other
citizens. The democratic legitimacy of this indirect income redistribu-
tion is often doubtful, especially if it is implemented through adminis-
18 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Competition Rules for Governments and for
Private Business, 30 J. WoRLD TRADE 5 (June 1996).
19 For a discussion of these questions see NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMnC LAW (M. Hilf & E.U. Petersmann eds., 1993).
20 For modem surveys of the evolution of international trade and economic theory see eg.,
ANALYTICAL AND NEGOTIATING ISSUES IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM (Alan V. Deardorff
& Robert M. Stem eds., 1994); J. BHAGWAT, POLITICAL ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NOMICS (1991); W.M. CORDEN, TRADE POLICY AND ECONOMIC WELFARE (1974).
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trativefiat without parliamentary control so as to accommodate "rent-
seeking" interest groups.
2'
2. Foreign Policy as Domestic Policy
Because foreign policy powers (e.g., to levy tariffs, restrict im-
ports, devalue the exchange rate or wage war) often operate by taxing
and restricting domestic citizens and enable governments to redistrib-
ute income among domestic groups (e.g., by granting protection rents
to powerful lobbies), foreign policy instruments can be used to circum-
vent the legal restraints on domestic policy instruments (e.g., on the
general taxing and spending powers of governments). Thus, rather
than asking for parliamentary authorization for domestic subsidies,
governments often prefer to subsidize their clientdles indirectly
through non-transparent, administrative non-tariff trade barriers.
Modem international relations theories rightly emphasize the domes-
tic sources of foreign policy demands ("all politics is local") as well as
their domestic policy functions (for example, in election campaigns). 2
3. Foreign Policy as a Prerogative of the Executive
International law assumes that the executive has comprehensive
foreign policy powers over e.g., treaty-making and international reme-
dies, even if foreign policy powers are exercized in violation of na-
tional law. Also, many national legal systems continue to view
international relations as a Machiavellian arena of power politics,
where the executive must enjoy broad discretionary foreign policy
powers without effective substantive and procedural constitutional re-
straints. But the "benevolent government assumption" - such as the
romantic view of J.J.Rousseau (1712-1778) that governments act as
mere agents of the "general will" of the people, and "this general will
... tends always to the preservation and welfare of the whole and of
21 Rent-seeking is a widely used term for directly unproductive, resource-using activities
(such as lobbying for governmental market distortions by means of tariffs, quantitative restric-
tions, antidumping measures and subsidies) which do not produce new goods or services but
redistribute income (e.g., monopoly rents) towards the rent-seekers at the expense of consumers,
tax-payers and society at large. Regulatory discretion facilitates, and therefore acts as an incen-
tive for, rent-seeking, which can change the losers in economic markets into the winners in the
political markets. Rent-seeking is economically and politically harmful because it reduces con-
sumer welfare and favors corporatist structures of interlocking political and private interest
groups and interest group politics detrimental to the general interest (e.g., of consumers in non-
discriminatory liberal trade). Empirical evidence suggests that rent-seeking is widespread and
has a strong bearing on the discretionary trade policies in many countries.
22 Cf. Ethan B. Kapstein, Is Realism Dead? The Domestic Sources of International Politics,
in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATON 751-74 (1995).
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every part ' 23 _ is inconsistent with the centuries-old reality of wel-
fare-reducing foreign policies (such as wars and protectionism), and
also with the theoretical perception of citizens as self-interested utility
maximizers (homo economicus). Rousseau's fiction - that "la volont6
grnrrale" and "la volont6 de tous" are by definition identical - ig-
nores the most difficult constitutional problem identified by the
founding fathers of the U.S. Constitution: that the less government
powers are constitutionally restrained, the more they risk being
abused ("all power risks to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts abso-
lutely"); and that constitutions must also provide "checks and bal-
ances" against the risks of parliamentarian interest-group politics and
a possible dictatorship by the majority (as in the French revolution
under Robespierre).
4. Inadequate Parliamentary and Judicial Control
The risk of false majorities (e.g., in parliamentary "log-rolling")
exists particularly in the economic and foreign policy areas, as evi-
denced by the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 by the U.S.
Congress which triggered a worldwide wave of protectionism and eco-
nomic depression. The indirect and often non-transparent manner of
taxing domestic citizens and redistributing their income through dis-
cretionary foreign policy instruments contributes not only to rent-seek-
ing interest group politics, but also to a "rational ignorance" of most
citizens vis-A-vis the politicized exercise of foreign policy discretion
(e.g., regarding the thousands of customs tariffs). The frequent parlia-
mentary assertion of unlimited regulatory powers in the foreign policy
area and the widespread judicial "political question doctrines" con-
cerning domestic policy measures and the judicial self-restraint con-
cerning foreign "acts of state;" weaken the constitutional restraints on
foreign policy powers even further.
5. Irrational Double Standards
The frequent xenophobia ("we" versus "they"), mercantilist
thinking ("exports are good, imports are bad") and other double stan-
dards in foreign policy-making (e.g., liberalization of domestic trade,
protectionism vis-4-vis foreign trade) make it easy for politicians to
23 THE POLrICAL WRITINGS OF JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU 241 (C.E. Vaughan ed., 1915).
According to Rousseau, the general will is always right: "The social compact gives the body
politic absolute power over all its members. Each man alienates, I admit, by the social compact
only such part of his powers, goods and liberty as it is important for the community to control;
but it must also be granted that the sovereign is sole judge of what is important" (Social Con-
tract, II, iv).
Constitutionalism and International Organizations
17:398 (1996-97)
present foreign policy measures as being in the "national interest,"
even if they reduce national consumer welfare (e.g., anti-dumping
measures against low-priced imports) and punish foreigners for acts
(e.g., "dumping" of low-priced products) that are considered laudable
when done by a fellow citizen. In contrast to domestic policy, citizens
often view foreign policy as a black box to be left to the "foreign pol-
icy experts." As a consequence, the foreign policies tend to be less
transparent and less effectively controlled by the public than domestic
policies.
Modem constitutional democracies proceed from the individual-
ist premise that values can be derived only from the individual, and
only if his or her human dignity, individual liberty and legal equality
are effectively protected. 24 The general public interest of the citizens
cannot even be known by governments without enabling their citizens
to freely express their individual preferences in transparent, demo-
cratic decision-making processes and open markets. From this rights-
based perspective, the main task of foreign policy-making must be to
negotiate national and international rules and procedures enabling cit-
izens to exercise their equal rights across frontiers and protecting
them from abuses of foreign policy powers. Without effective consti-
tutional restraints on the traditional foreign policy discretion, govern-
ments will be unable to maximize the general interests of their citizens
in equal liberties and democratic peace across frontiers. For "demo-
cratic government, if nominally omnipotent, becomes as a result of
unlimited powers exceedingly weak, the playball of all the separate
interests it has to satisfy to secure majority support."25
But how can discretionary foreign policy powers be constitution-
alized? Why are most governments politically unable to liberalize
their welfare-reducing trade barriers unilaterally, as recommended by
economic theory? What determines foreign policy-making? Are the
causes of wars and international economic conflicts to be sought in the
international state-system, in the inter-actions among social groups, in
the widespread existence of economic and social injustice as empha-
sized e.g., in the Constitution of the International Labour Organiza-
tion ("universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based
upon social justice"), or in individual actions and the denial of demo-
24 See, e.g., Article 1 of the 1949 Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany: "(1) The
dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state author-
ity. (2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as
the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world. (3) The following basic rights
shall bind the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as directly enforceable law."
25 3 F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEoISLATION AND LmERTY 99 (1982).
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cratic principles, as emphasized e.g., in the Constitution of the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization ("since
wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the
defenses of peace must be constructed")? International relations the-
ories offer diverging answers to these questions (See Table 2).26 But
both modem economic "public choice theories" as well as "constitu-
tional theories" criticize the "myth of benevolent government." They
posit that the perception of man as a self-interested "utility maxi-
mizer" (homo economicus) is a more useful model for analyzing and
explaining not only economic markets but also political markets.27 As
all governments depend on domestic political support, and there are
powerful domestic group interests benefiting from the redistributive
effects of most foreign policy decisions, the existing asymmetries in
policy-making processes and the proper constitution and legal limita-
tion of policy powers are the central problem in the foreign policy
area. The different approaches to this constitutional problem are
strongly influenced by the different national traditions and concepts of
government and foreign policy-making.
B. The Hobbesian Concept of Power Politics and Economic
Mercantilism
According to the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-
1679), life in a society without central government and without gen-
eral rules risks to be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" because
the conflicts between the selfish short-term interests of individuals
may lead to a constant "war of all against all." Hence, there is a need
for a strong government to protect the rule of law so as to overcome
the "Hobbesian War." Thomas Hobbes conceived government as a
"benevolent dictator" above the law ("legibus absolutus"). The "so-
cial contract" proposed by Hobbes implied a ceding of individual
rights to absolute monarchies with legally unlimited powers, con-
strained only by their moral accountability to God. The "public inter-
est" to be protected by the sovereign was the sum of the individual
26 For an interdisciplinary analysis of the international trading system from the point of view
of these different theories see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Transformation of the World Trad-
ing System through the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 6 EuR J.
INt'L L. 161 (1995).
27 For a criticism of the public interest model see Brennan & Buchanan, supra note 14, at 33-
45. Even though the homo economicus model may embody more cynicism about individual be-
havior patterns than evidence warrants, its usefulness for designing constitutional rules has long
been recognized e.g., in the writings of David Hume: "'n constraining any system of government
and fixing the several checks and controls of the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a
knave and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest." Id. at 59.
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Table 2: Premises of Major International Relations Theories
"Realist" theories ("Third
images" focusing on the state-
system)
"Neoliberal Regime" theories
focusing on international rules
and organizations for




"Public choice theories" ("Frst
and second images" focusing on
individual actions, interest group
politics and governments)
Premises: (1) States are key actors in world affairs; (2) They act as
unitary-rational maximizers of national interests; (3) International
anarchy (i.e., national self-help due to lack of centralized authority)
is the principal force conditioning the actions of states; (4) States
are therefore preoccupied with their security, independence and
relative power ("high politics," security dilemma); (5) They often
fail to cooperate even when they have common interests
(hegemonic cycles of expansion, recession or balance of power
"defensive positionalism").
Premises: International rules, procedures and institutions
("regimes") can help states to overcome the systemic "prisoner
dilemma" and "free-rider dilemma" of international relations
among sovereign self-interested states "after hegemony" through
(1) formation of "clubs" with advanced-country participants,
(2) monitoring of rule-compliance (as a disincentive for
"cheating"), (3) institutionalized fora for long-term cooperation
("game iteration" and "tit-for-tat strategies"), (4) rule-oriented
reduction of international transaction costs and (5) sanctions
towards "free-riders."
Premises: Functional integration of "low politics" based on self-
interests of subnational and supranational actors enables "attitude
change" ("deeds, not words," participation of citizens,
depoliticization). It can expand indirectly to areas of "high politics"
due to transnational interest groups, functional interdependences
("spill-over"), advantages of international cooperation and transfer
of powers to international organizations ("form follows function,"
"networks of pooled sovereignty," political "push" and "pull-over"
through intergovernmental package deals and supranational
organizations).
4- -
Premises: Methodological individualism (there is no "national
interest;" private and public choices are made by individuals which
tend to maximize their self-interests; individual preferences differ).
Methodological pluralism (e.g., political processes are determined
by incentives for individuals, interest groups, bureaucracies etc.;
"rent-seeking" and redistributive effects of policies are important
incentives). Asymmetries in the political influence of group
interests favor "government failures" .(similar to "market failures"
in private markets). Importance of small groups for the supply of
"public goods." Domestic politics, "rent-seeking" and non-state
actors are determinants also of foreign policies (e.g., success of
"market integration," failures of "policy integration" in EC).
Constitutional theories ("First, Premises: Individual liberty/dignity and legal equality as highest
second and third images") sources of values. Need for protecting individual political equality
through constitutional constraints on collective democratic
procedures. Necessity of general, long-term "constitutional rules"
of a higher legal rank for the protection of fundamental individual
rights and for limiting abuses of powers in "post-constitutional
policy processes." Inalienable human rights, rule of law, separation
of powers (notably judicial protection of individual rights and of
their supremacy over government powers) and "constitutionally
limited democracy" as bases for constitutional reforms.
Decentralized spontaneous coordination and satisfaction of
individual preferences as constitutional values.
interests of the domestic citizens. But Leviathan's discretion to define
and pursue this "public interest" was legally unlimited. Accordingly,
both domestic and international law permitted the use of power and
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wars as instruments of foreign policy. The international state system,
for instance between the Westphalian peace treaties (1648) and the
First World War (1914), remained characterized by "international an-
archy" and unstable "self-help" systems. International economic rela-
tions, until the middle of the 19th century, remained dominated by
power-oriented mercantilism and colonialism, that is, the attempt to
increase the gold and silver supplies of the rulers, and thereby their
political and military power, by means of import restrictions, export
subsidies, colonial preferences, monopolistic navigation acts and mon-
etary "bullionism."
At least implicitly, the Hobbesian concept of almost unlimited
government powers and mercantilist import substitution have contin-
ued to shape the policies of many communist countries and less-devel-
oped countries after World War II. In Africa south of the Sahara, for
instance, "development dictatorships," protectionism, import-substitu-
tion policies, trade preferences for the former colonial powers, mone-
tary restrictions, market-sharing arrangements (e.g., for international
shipping services) and weak law-enforcement have remained wide-
spread, and prompted many African countries to accept no significant
trade liberalization commitments under GATT law (Nigeria, for in-
stance, had only a single tariff binding for stockfish until the 1980s).
As predicted by economic and political theory,28 political instability,
economic under-development, legal insecurity with investment disin-
centives and unnecessary poverty were the logical consequences of
such power politics in many of these countries.
28 Since Adam Smith's INQUIRY INTO Ti-E NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NA-
TrIONS (1776), it has become general opinion among economists that mercantilist trade restric-
tions reduce, rather than increase, consumer welfare subject to a few academic exceptions, the
conditions of which are almost impossible to determine in reality. Already two hundred years
ago, in his draft treaty on "Perpetual Peace" (1796), the German philosopher Kant also ex-
plained why non-democracies are more likely to engage in welfare-reducing power politics than
democracies: "If... the consent of the citizens is required to decide whether or not war is to be
declared, it is very natural that they will have great hesitation in embarking on so dangerous an
enterprise. For this would mean calling down on themselves all the miseries of war... But
under a constitution where the subject is not a citizen, and which is therefore not republican, it is
the simplest thing in the world to go to war. For the head of state is not a fellow citizen but the
owner of the state, a war will not force him to make the slightest sacrifice so far as his banquets,
hunts, pleasure palaces and court festivals are concerned." See I. Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philo-
sophical Sketch, in KArr, POLITICAL WRITINGs 100 (Hans Reiss & H.B. Nisbet ed., 1991). Em-
pirical research appears to confirm that no stable democracy seems to have waged war against
another over the past 50 years. See John M. Owen, How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,
19 INTL SEC. 87, 122 (1994).
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C. The Lockean Concept of Rights-Based Domestic Policies and
the "Primacy of Foreign Policy:" The Example of the U.S.
and EC Implementing Legislation for the 1994
WTO Agreement
During the 18th century, the value premises and abuses of monar-
chical absolutism and of mercantilist trade policies were increasingly
challenged. According to John Locke (1632-1704), the sole legitimate
task of governments was to protect the basic rights of the citizens,
such as the right to life, liberty and property. The social contract
served the purpose of establishing governments with limited powers to
protect these equal rights, which the citizens retained as inalienable
rights. The legitimacy of this governmental task derived also from the
fact that only the protection of equal rights of the citizens benefits
everyone. The public interest to be promoted by governments was
conceived as being identical with the sum of the individual interests of
domestic citizens, as protected by their equal rights and democratic
decision-making procedures. Since democratically elected govern-
ments had no mandate to violate the rights of their citizens, the major-
ity of the founding fathers of the U.S. Constitution even considered it
unnecessary to list the inalienable fundamental rights in the U.S. Con-
stitution. In contrast to the supremacy of fundamental rights for do-
mestic policy-making within constitutional democracies, John Locke
admitted, however, that foreign policy powers are "much less capable
to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws,... and so must
necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those whose hands
it is in, to be managed for the public good:"
What is to be done in reference to foreigners, depending much upon
their actions, and the variations of designs and interests, must be left in
great part to the prudence of those who have this power committed to
Commto bealtged by the best of their skill, for the advantage of the
This lack of effective legal restraints on foreign policy powers and
the optimistic reliance on the "prudence and wisdom" of politicians
entailed a dilemma in Locke's constitutional theory. This was aggra-
vated by Locke's view that the domestic executive powers and the
foreign policy powers "are hardly to be separated, and placed... in
the hands of distinct persons," because "both of them requiring the
force of the society for their exercise, it is almost impracticable to
place [them] ... in distinct, and not subordinate hands, or... in per-
sons that might act separately,. . . which would be apt sometime or
29 2 JonN LocKE, Two TR1ASTss OF CIVL GovERNMENT ch. 12 (1690).
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other to cause disorder and ruine."3 ° Yet, since foreign policy powers
operate by taxing and restricting domestic citizens and are often not
separable from domestic policy powers, the constitutional restraints
remained incomplete and ineffective without a foreign policy constitu-
tion. In Montesquieu's (1689-1755) theory of separation of legislative,
executive and judicial governmental powers, the foreign policy powers
were perceived as limited by international law.31 In state practice,
however, most governments assert constitutional power to violate in-
ternational law in the name of the "primacy of foreign policy" and of
alleged "national interests." But these "national interests" are often
the interests of the government in power rather than the interests of
its citizens in rule of law, individual rights and open markets.
1. Implementation of the WTO Agreement in U.S. Law:
Congressional and Executive Discretion to Violate
International Law
In U.S. constitutional law and jurisprudence, the commerce
clause in Article I, sec.8, cl.3 of the U.S. Constitution is construed as a
seemingly unlimited power of Congress to restrict or completely pro-
hibit foreign trade, including judicial review of foreign trade restric-
tions. United States foreign trade legislation generally declares
international trade agreements not to be self-executing, and U.S.
courts have long since held that "no one has a vested right to trade
with foreign nations."'3 Also the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements
Act of the U.S. Congress specifically provides:
No provision of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the appli-
cation of any such provision to any person or circumstance, that is incon-
sistent with any law of the United States shall have effect.
33
Furthermore, Section 102(c)(1) explicitly mandates that no per-
son other than the United States "shall have any cause of action or
defense under any of the Uruguay Round Agreements" or challenge
"any action or inaction . . , of the United States, an } State, or any
political subdivision of a state on the ground that such action or inac-
tion is inconsistent" with one of the Uruguay Round Agreements.
The Uruguay Round Agreements are thus unlikely to be directly ap-
plied by U.S. courts in any proceeding other than a proceeding
brought by the U.S. government for the purpose of enforcing obliga-
30 Id.
31 See MoNTEQuIEu, DE L'ESPRrr DES Lois ch. VI (1748).
32 For a discussion of this U.S. practice see NATIONAL CONSTrUTIONS AND INTERNAMONAL
ECONONc LAW, supra note 19, at 14-17.
33 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 §102 (1994).
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tions under these agreements. To the extent thai the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act does not specifically implement the international ob-
ligations, prior legislation and regulatory powers will prevail, as stated
in Section 102(a)(2):
CONSTRUCTION: Nothing in this Act shall be construed
(A) to amend or modify any law of the United States, including any law
relating to
(i) the protection of human, animal, or plant life or health,
(ii) the protection of the environment, or
(iii) worker safety, or
(B) to limit any authority conferred under any law of the United States,
including section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, unless specifically pro-
vided for in this Act.
Under the "later-in-time-rule" of U.S. constitutional law and
practice, statutes later-in-time take precedence over both earlier stat-
utes and international treaties. If statutory law is unclear and does not
specifically provide for compliance with the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments, administrative agencies may deviate from the international
WTO obligations. Pursuant to the "Chevron doctrine," U.S. courts
will defer to such agency interpretation of a statute provided it is
"reasonable. ' 34
International disputes over the consistency of U.S. laws and ad-
ministrative regulations with the international guarantees of freedom
and non-discrimination in WTO law are therefore more likely to be
resolved at the international WTO level than before domestic U.S.
courts. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act requires that WTO dis-
pute settlement proceedings involving the United States are carried
out by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) in a transparent man-
ner (e.g., publication of U.S. submissions in conformity with the Free-
dom of Information Act) in close consultation with Congressional
committees, private sector and non-governmental organizations, It
also makes clear that any WTO dispute settlement decision finding
the U.S. in violation of its WTO obligations, notwithstanding its le-
gally binding force under international law, will not be incorporated
into U.S. law without following a specified domestic implementation
process controlled by Congress and a "WTO Dispute Settlement Re-
34 On the Chevron Doctrine and its influence on the formulation of the "standard of review"
in the WTO dispute settlement procedures see S. P. Croley & J. H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Pro-
cedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 2 AM. J. Iwr'L L. 193
(1996). See also D. Leebron, Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results in the United States,
in CONSTrrUTIONAL AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE
URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS (J. H. Jackson & A. 0. Sykes eds., 1997).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 17:398 (1996-97)
view Commission" consisting of five federal appeals court judges. 5
The Commission, whose establishment was considered necessary in
order to control and scrutinize the quasi-automatic adoption of WTO
dispute settlement reports, is charged with reviewing all WTO dispute
settlement reports finding against the United States so as to determine
whether the WTO Panel or Appellate Body
(A) ... exceeded its authority or its terms of reference;
(B) ... added to the obligations of or diminished the rights of the United
States under the Uruguay Round Agreement which is the subject of
report;
(C) ... acted arbitrarily or capriciously, engaged in misconduct, or de-
monstrably departed from the procedures specified for panels and Ap-
pellate Bodies in the applicable Uruguay Round Agreement; and
(D) ... deviated from the applicable standard of review, including in
antidumping, countervailing duty, and other unfair trade remedy cases,
the standard of review set forth in Article 17.6 of the Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994."
In case of such a determination, Congress can direct the President
to undertake negotiations to modify the WTO dispute settlement
rules and, following three such determinations by the Commission
within a 5-year period, require U.S. withdrawal from the WTO. While
such determinations and U.S. withdrawal from the WTO appear un-
likely, and the existence of these review procedures may assist the
President in fending off protectionist interest group pressures, they
put the WTO and the USTR on notice that the U.S. Congress will
control trade policy-making processes and WTO dispute settlement
proceedings in a manner transparent to the public. But the denial of
direct effect of WTO law in U.S. domestic law can also operate as an
invitation for domestic interest groups to lobby for implementing laws
and agency regulations inconsistent with international law. The pro-
tectionist Smoot-Hawley tariffs of 1930 are an infamous example of
how congressional log-rolling on behalf of rent-seeking interest
groups can trigger a disastrous worldwide economic crisis. The lack of
effective judicial review by U.S. courts of compliance with the interna-
tional WTO guarantees of freedom, non-discrimination and rule-of-
law reduces the "checks and balances" in the trade policy area even
further. United States law thus not only enables the legislature, exec-
utive and courts to deviate from WTO law in a manner inconsistent
with the international legal obligations undertaken by the United
35 See G.N. Horlick, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Dole Commission, 6 J. WoRLD TRADE
45-48 (1995).
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States, but also, notwithstanding the impressive assertion of congres-
sional control over the implementation of WTO law, sets strong incen-
tives for rent-seeking interest groups to influence the domestic
implementing rules to their benefit. For example, according to the
"1995 Report on the WTO Consistency of Trade Policies by Major
Trading Partners" published by the Japanese Government's advisory
"Industrial Structure Council," over 650 pages of the U.S. Uruguay
Round Agreements Act include a large number of such protectionist
departures from the international WTO law. 6
2. Implementation of the WTO Agreement in EC Law: Discretion
of the EC Council to Violate International Guarantees of
Freedom and Non-Discrimination?
Following the U.S. precedent, the EC Council Decision of 22 De-
cember on the conclusion, on behalf of the EC, of the Uruguay Round
Agreements includes the following paragraph:
Whereas, by its nature, the Agreement establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization, including the Annexes thereto, is not susceptible to being
directly invoked in Community or Member State courts."
As the WTO Agreements include numerous precise and uncondi-
tional guarantees of freedom, non-discrimination and private rights,
such as the intellectual property rights protected in the Agreement on
Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the large
number of guarantees of private access to domestic courts (e.g., in Ar-
ticle X GATT, Article 14 Antidumping Agreement, Article 23 Subsi-
dies Agreement, Article 42 TRIPS Agreement), the reference to the
"nature" of the WTO Agreements is no convincing reason for
preventing EC citizens from invoking precise and unconditional WTO
rules before domestic courts. Article XX:2 of the WTO Agreement
on Government Procurement, for instance, by requiring each member
country to "provide non-discriminatory, timely, transparent and effec-
tive procedures enabling suppliers to challenge alleged breaches of the
Agreement arising in the context of procurements in which they have,
or have had, an interest," could be read to require the direct applica-
bility of the Government Procurement Agreement in such domestic
"challenge proceedings." In several EC member countries (such as
Germany) and other WTO member states (such as Switzerland), the
official government statements on the national implementing legisla-
36 Cf. 1995 Report on the WTO Consistency of Trade Policies by Major Trading Partners,
Industrial Structure Council, Japan, 1995, at 83 seq.
37 Official Journal of the EC, No. L336-2 (December 23, 1994).
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tion explicitly recognize that the TRIPS Agreement rules may be di-
rectly applicable and enforceable in domestic courts.
The denial of any rights of EC citizens to invoke the 25,000 pages
of WTO law before domestic courts is also difficult to reconcile with
the principle of "primacy of international law," which is recognized in
many EC Treaty provisions (such as Articles 228-234). Pursuant to
Article 228:7 of the EC Treaty, international agreements concluded by
the EC "shall be binding on the institutions of the Community and on
Member States." This obligation under "primary EC law" has so far
been construed by the EC Court to the effect that international agree-
ments concluded by the EC become an "integral part of the Commu-
nity legal system" with legal primacy over "secondary EC law" (such
as EC Council regulations).38 The above-mentioned attempt by the.
EC Council to evade these constitutional restraints and to prevent EC
citizens from invoking the international WTO obligations of the EC in
domestic courts is inconsistent with the EC primary law principle of
"primacy of international law" and is therefore not legally binding on
the EC Court. The EC Court remains free to decide that directly ap-
plicable WTO rules are an integral part of Community law and, in
view also of their ratification by the parliaments of EC member states,
may not be ignored at the whim of a majority in the EC Council.
In a series of judgments and preliminary rulings in 1994/95 on the
EC Council Regulation No.404/93 of February 1993 on the EC's com-
mon market organization for bananas, the EC Court has, however,
denied both EC member states as well as EC citizens the right to in-
yoke the international GATT obligations of the EC in domestic
courts, including the EC Court, unless the contested EC regulations
explicitly acknowledge their objective of implementing GATT obliga-
tions.39 The practical effect of this new EC jurisprudence is to leave to
the EC Council whether it wants to comply with the international
GAT obligations of the EC, and whether it wants to allow EC
Courts and domestic courts to review the GATT-consistency of EC
secondary law. Paradoxically, compliance by the EC with the self-im-
posed WTO obligations of the EC and its member states may there-
fore be protected more effectively through the WTO dispute
settlement system than through the EC Court of Justice. The above-
mentioned Council Decision on the conclusion of the Uruguay Round
Agreements shows a clear preference of the Council for maximizing
its own trade policy powers, rather than the rights and interests of EC
38 On the EC's foreign policy constitution see Petersmann, supra note 2, at 1159-72.
39 For a criticism of this case law see Petersmann, supra note 19.
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citizens as protected by WTO law. Foreign policy considerations, such
as emulating the corresponding provision in the U.S. Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, and reciprocal bargaining are seen as more impor-
tant than protecting the rights of EC citizens by allowing them to in-
voke precise and unconditional WTO rules in domestic courts.
3. The "Lockean Dilemma:" "Primacy of Foreign Policy" vs. the
International Rule of Law
The EC and U.S. implementing legislation for the Uruguay
Round Agreements. illustrate the continuing "Lockean dilemma" of
EC and U.S. foreign trade laws: international law asserts legal primacy
over domestic law, as illustrated by Article 27 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties ("A party may not invoke the pro-
visions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a
treaty"), and requires its performance in good faith (cf. Article 26 of
the Vienna Convention). The self-imposed international legal obliga-
tions also include numerous safeguard provisions which enable each
member country to protect its national interests and to challenge
treaty violations by other members. Yet, national legislatures and ex-
ecutives insist on their power to tax and restrict domestic citizens also
in clear violation of voluntarily undertaken international guarantees
of freedom, non-discrimination and rule of law, such as those con-
tained in WTO law. And to this effect, they prevent domestic citizens
and courts to directly apply the international rules concerned. The
large number of GAIT dispute settlement findings on the GATr-in-
consistency of e.g., U.S. and EC measures illustrates that such legal
inconsistencies between the international and the domestic conduct of
governments are not merely theoretical hypotheses, but frequent
realities.
The paternalistic "mediation" of the citizens' interests by "benev-
olent governments" might not be perceived as a problem from a
Hobbesian perspective of government. But if governments are viewed
from a Lockean perspective as having limited powers, whose legiti-
macy derives from the protection of the equal liberties and other
rights of their citizens, the legal incapacitation of the citizens in the
area of international trade law can be seen as a "Lockean dilemma."
The legal inconsistencies between international and domestic trade
rules undermine legal security and the effectiveness of international
and domestic law. They also raise doubts about the good faith and
legitimacy of governments which negotiate international guarantees of
freedom and non-discrimination for the benefit of domestic citizens
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but, in the context of the domestic implementing measures, often give
in to protectionist pressures for departures from self-imposed interna-
tional legal commitments and prevent their own citizens and courts
from relying on the international rule of law.
D. The Kantian Concept of National and International
Constitutionalism
That foreign policy powers require specific constitutional re-
straints, was already recognized in some of the "city constitutions" of
the Italian city republics during the Middle Ages. D. Gianotti's book
on "The Florentine Republic" (1534), for instance, stressed the need
for the separation of powers based on the distinction of four state
functions (elections, legislation, execution, foreign and security policy)
and three decision-making phases (initiation of proposals, delibera-
tion and decision, judicial review).40 But it was the German philoso-
pher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) who explained first why the
"constitutionalization" of domestic policy powers cannot remain effec-
tive without a corresponding constitutionalization of foreign policy
powers through international legal rules for the relations among states
as well as vis-A-vis foreign citizens.
In his "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Pur-
pose" (1784), Kant emphasized that "the problem of establishing a
perfect civil constitution is subordinate to the problem of a law-gov-
erned external relationship with other states, and cannot be solved un-
less the latter is also solved." As elaborated in Kant's proposals for an
international treaty on "Perpetual Peace" (1795), this "hidden plan of
nature to bring about an internally - and for this purpose also exter-
nally - perfect constitution as the only possible state within which all
natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely" requires
extension of the rule-of-law principles to the intergovernmental rela-
tions among states as well as to their transnational relations with for-
eign citizens.41 For the law can prevail both at home and abroad only
if war is abolished as a means of politics and peace is established in
national and in international relations according to the principles of
equal rights.
40 See generally DONATO GiAao-, REPUBLICA FIORENTINA (Giovanni Silavano ed.,
Librairie Droz S.A. 1990).
41 See Kant, supra note 28, at 47, 50. See also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Foreign Policy
Constitution of the European Union: A Kantian Perspective, in FESTsCmsFr FOR E.J.
MESTMACKER 433-448 (1996); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Rights and Duties of States and Rights
and Duties of their Citizens, in Rcirr ZWISCHEN UMBRUCH UND BEWAHRUNG: VOLKERRECHT,
EuoPARnctrr, STAATSRECI-rr, FESTSCHRiFr FOR R. BERNHARDT, 1087-1128 (1995).
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Kant's ethical theory was aimed at "a constitution allowing the
greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws which en-
sure that the freedom of each can coexist with the freedom of all
others." The individual freedoms were conceived as rights (e.g., to
freedom, legal equality, property, participation in the government and
popular sovereignty) so as to enable their enforcement against anyone
who violates freedom illegitimately. In order to secure peace at the
national and international level, "all men who can at all influence one
another must adhere to some kind of civil constitution" of the three
following types:
(1) a constitution based on the civil rights of individuals within a nation
(ius civitatis);
(2) a constitution based on the international rights of states in their rela-
tionships with one another (ius gentium);
(3) a constitution based on cosmopolitan right, in so far as individuals
and states, coexisting in an external relationship of mutual influences,
may be regarded as citizens of a universal state of mankind (ius cosmo-
politicum). This classification, with respect to the idea of a perpetual
peace, is not arbitrary but necessary. For if even one of the parties were
able to influence the others physically and yet itself remained in a state
of nature, there would be a risk of war, which it is precisely the aim of
the above articles to prevent.42
It is noteworthy that Kant's rights-based approach for a national
as well as international "law-governed social order," in which social
antagonisms can be overcome through peaceful change on the basis of
general rules and judicial protection of equal rights, is also advocated
by the economic theory of property rights, because the proper func-
tioning of both economic and political markets depends on the assign-
ment of property rights to all market participants and to all scarce
resources. 43 In state practice, the experience with European Commu-
nity (EC) law and with the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) appears to have vindicated such a liberal rights-based ap-
proach, for the effectiveness of the EC Treaty's customs union rules
and of the ECHR's human rights guarantees was largely a function of
the judicial protection of corresponding individual rights by the EC
Court and the European Court of Human Rights. For instance, the
internal "market freedoms" of the EC Treaty's customs union law
were effectively enforced by the EC Court as directly applicable indi-
vidual rights vis-A-vis national trade restrictions. But the Court never
recognized corresponding "market freedoms" in the foreign trade law
42 Kant, supra note 28, at 98.
43 See generally NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra
note 19, at 25-28.
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of the EC vis-a-vis trade restrictions imposed by the EC institutions.
As'a consequence, the EC's foreign trade law remained characterized
by protectionist trade restrictions which - even if they had been found
to be clearly illegal in GATT dispute settlement proceedings between
the EC and third GATT contracting parties - were often maintained
and not challenged by the EC Court, notwithstanding their welfare-
reducing and discriminatory effects on EC citizens." As predicted by
Kant, the effectiveness of national and international guarantees of
freedom and non-discrimination has depended, at least in European
integration, on enabling the citizens to defend such freedoms as indi-
vidual rights to be protected by the courts.
IV. THE KANTIAN MPERATfvz. CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES OF FREEDOM, NON-
DIsCRIMINATION, RULE-OF-LAW AND
"DEMOcRATIc PEACE"
Kant's proposals for extending the constitutional concept of the
Rechtsstaat - the state governed according to the rule of law and
aimed at protecting the equal liberties of the citizens in conformity
with the principle ("categorical imperative") 'of acting according to
maxims which can at the same time become universal laws - to inter-
national relations did not envisage the establishment of international
organizations. His proposal for an international treaty on "perpetual
peace" was limited to republican states, whose domestic'and foreign
policy arrangements ought to be based on universally applicable lib-
eral principles. Kant's expectation was that, as individual citizens (in
contrast to heads of state) have to bear the costs of welfare-reducing
foreign policies (such as Wars), their self-interest would lead them to
vote for rule-oriented rather than power-oriented policies also in in-
ternational affairs.4 5 The federation of republican states opposed to
war would have to be progressively enlarged. But progress towards
rationality, e.g., the establishment of a republican constitution, could
not be held up for long. Kant emphasized that the international "fed-
eration of peoples.., would not be the same thing as an international
state:"
This federation does not aim to acquire any power like that of a state,
but merely to preserve and secure the freedom of each state in itself,
along with that of the other confederated states, although this does not
44 See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International and European Foreign Trade Law: GA7T
Dispute Settlement Proceedings against the EEC, 22 COMMON MKr. L. REv. 441 (1985).
45 See Kant, supra note 28, at 100.
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mean that they need to submit to public laws and to a coercive power
which enforces them, as do men in a state of nature. It can be shown
that this idea of federalism, extending gradually to encompass all states
and thus leading to perpetual peace, is practicable and has objective
reality.46
Kant did not explain, however, why hierarchical organizations
were needed for securing peace and rule of law within states, but not
among states. He rather conceived "an enduring and gradually ex-
panding federation likely to prevent war" as a sub-optimal substitute
as long as "the positive idea of a world republic cannot be realized:"
There is only one rational way in which states coexisting with other
states can emerge from the lawless condition of pure warfare. Just like
individual men, they must renounce their savage and lawless freedom,
adapt themselves to public coercive laws, and thus form an international
state (civitas gentium), which would necessarily continue to grow until it
embraced all the peoples of the earth. But since this is not the will of the
nations, according to their present conception of international right ....
the positive idea of a world republic cannot be realized. If. all is not to be
lost, this can at best find a negative substitute in the shape of an endur-
ing and gradually expanding federation likely to prevent war.47
It was only through the traumatic experiences of World Wars I
and II that governments finally learned to accept the need for world-
wide constitutional rules (such as the prohibition of the use of force
and the collective security arrangements in the UN Charter) and their
collective enforcement through international organizations (such as
the UN and its Security Council). Not only within states, but also
among states do the limitation of government failures and the supply
of "public goods" depend on agreed procedures and institutions for
rule-making, rule-application and rule-enforcement (cf. Table 1).
Judging from our historical experience with "constitutionalizing" do-
mestic policy powers, there is no reason to assume that the principles
of "constitutionalism" (infra section A), discovered in painful political
processes of "trial and error" over more than 2,500 years of political
history, may be less important for "domesticating" foreign policy pow-
ers than they have been for limiting abuses of domestic policy powers
in constitutional democracies. A close look at EC law (infra section
B) and at the law of worldwide organizations, such as the UN and the
WTO (infra section C), confirms the empirical fact that these interna-
tional treaties include a large number of "constitutional guarantees"
of freedom, non-discrimination, rule of law, separation of powers and
other fundamental rights which are increasingly enforced through na-
46 See id., at 102, 104.
47 See id., at 105.
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tional and international courts and are of importance also for the in-
terpretation and application of WTO law.
A. National and International Constitutionalism: A Brief Survey
Constitutionalism was preceded by a long history of political eth-
ics, whose major insights can be subdivided into three major branches:
Person-oriented ethics focusing on the virtues of the rulers (e.g., Plato's
philosopher kings, Erasmus' "Institutio principis christiani," or
Machiavelli's "Prince").
Institution-oriented ethics searching for rules and institutions so as to
limit abuses of government powers and protect the liberty of citizens
through the rule of law (e.g., Aristotle's comparative analysis of 158 city
constitutions so as to discover the best conditions for man's life as a
"political animal"); and
Result-oriented ethics focusing on the output of political processes (e.g.,
Popper's emphasis on piecemeal reforms based on "trial and error,"
rather than utopian "social engineering" with possibly dangerous side-
effects, and Rawl's proposals for "justice as fairness" and for a "differ-
ence principle" designed to ensure that social and economic inequalities
can be expected to be to everyone's advantage). 48
Kant perceived progress towards constitutional democracy as a
moral obligation of all people of good will. Yet, even though person-
oriented political ethics continues to be important in international re-
lations (as illustrated by the administering of an oath to the UN Secre-
tary-General and also to the members of the WTO's new Appellate
Body), it is laws and political institutions which, according to Kant,
can compel even a nation of devils - albeit not morally good in them-
selves - to behave as good citizens. 49 According to K. Popper, the fun-
damental question of law and political science is not "Who shall
govern?" It is rather "How much power must be delegated to govern-
ments? And how must laws and political institutions be designed so
that even incompetent and dishonest politicians cannot cause too
much harm?"5
The legal, economic and political structures of today's global sys-
tem differ fundamentally from the state-centered system between the
peace treaties of Westphalia (1648) and World War II. For instance,
in addition to roughly 200 sovereign states, there are today more than
300 intergovernmental international organizations, some of which
48 See Alois Riklin, Politische Ethik, in PoLmscmE THEORIE trND IDEENGEsCffCHTM im
GFSPRAcH 81-102 (H. Kramer ed. 1995) (explaining these three strands of political ethics).
49 Kant, supra note 28, at 112.
50 K.R. POPPER, AUF DER SUCHE NACH EINER BESSEREN WELT 249 (1984).
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have become important actors in international relations (such as the
UN Security Council) and even members in other international orga-
nizations (cf. the EC membership in the WTO). The international or-
ganizations established since World War I - such as the League of
Nations, the International Labour Organization, the UN, the Bretton
Woods Institutions, the Council of Europe and the European Com-
munities - reflect a variety of differing legal, procedural and institu-
tional approaches. But, notwithstanding the "pragmatism" regarding
legal-institutional reforms of international relations, the statutory
objectives of most international organizations are aimed at limiting
abuses of government powers (such as acts of aggression, oppression
of fundamental rights, welfare-reducing protectionism, competitive
monetary devaluations) and at supplying international public goods
(such as peace, legal security, stable exchange rates, currency converti-
bility, liberal trade, protection of the environment, democracy, social
welfare). As illustrated in Table 3, there are obvious parallels not only
between the basic principles of national constitutionalism (as listed in
sections a-f in the first column of Table 3) and the constitutional prin-
ciples of EC law (listed in the second column of Table 3); also the
international GATI'/WTO guarantees of freedom, non-discrimination
and rule of law correspond to basic constitutional principles (see the
third column of Table 3) and serve "constitutional functions" for the
protection of freedom, non-discrimination and rule of law in the trans-
national relations of individual citizens.51
B. Constitutionalism and the European Community:
A Brief Survey
The WTO world trade and legal system differs from systems like
the UN and IMF systems by its stringent legal disciplines for regional
organizations (notably free trade areas and customs unions) and the
full membership of the European Community. The regional law of
free trade areas and customs unions has often served as a pace-setter
for subsequent reforms of GATT law on the worldwide level. It is
also noteworthy in this respect that the basic postulates of national
constitutionalism have all been recognized as part of EC law.52 In
many instances, the initiatives for this progressive constitutionaliza-
tion of EC law did not come from the EC governments but from na-
tional courts and the EC Court, when they had been seized by EC
51 See Petersmann, supra note 4, at 210 (explaining these "constitutional functions" of the
liberal rules, e.g., in GAIT law, EC law and certain other international organizations, in detail).
52 See Petersmann, supra note 2, at 1123-1175 (showing this proposition in detail).
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Table 3: National and International Constitutionalism:
Constitutional Functions of International Guarantees of
Freedom, Non-discrimination and Rule of Law
National Constitutionalism European Community Law GATr/WTO Rules
a) Objective rule-of-law Objective rule-of-law principles Objective rule-of-law
principles and primacy of (e.g., non-discrimination principles, non-discrimination
constitutional rules over post- requirements in Article 6 EC) and transparency requirements
constitutional policy-making and interpretation of EC (e.g., in GATT Articles I, X
processes Treaty as a constitution with and XIII), legal primacy of
legal primacy over secondary WTO law over GATT' law
EC law and unwritten (Article XVI:3 WTO) and over
constitutional guarantees domestic laws (Article XVI:4
WTO)
b) Horizontal and vertical Separation of powers (e.g., Horizontal and vertical
separation of powers ("mixed among EC institutions and separation of power (e.g., in
constitutions") vertically according to the Articles III, XI, XXIII, XXIV
subsidiarity principle) GATT)
c) Limitation of government Judicial protection of directly GATT and GATS guarantees
powers through inalienable applicable "market freedoms" of freedom of trade; Limitation
fundamental rights (e.g., Article 30 EC) and of government powers through
(individualism as value fundamental rights guaranteed individual rights (e.g., Art. X
premise) by EC law (e.g., Article F GAIT: individual access to
TEU)* courts, TRIPS Agreement:
individual intellectual property
rights)
d) Necessity and Necessity and proportionality Legal ranking of trade policy
proportionality of all requirements of EC law and instruments in GAIT law
governmental restraints their judicial protection (e.g., according to their efficiency;
(individual liberty and legal in the context of Articles 30, prohibitions of "unnecessary"
equality as value premises) 36 EC) trade restrictions (e.g., in TBT
Agreement)
e) Democratic participation in EU citizenship, direct election Parliamentary ratification of
the exercise of government of European Parliament, GAT and WrO Agreements,
powers democracy as constitutional transparency requirements
principle of EU law (e.g.,
Article F TEU)
f) Social justice (e.g., through EC "social provisions" (e.g., Safeguard clauses for "public
progressive taxation, income Articles 117-122 EC), policy" purposes (e.g., in
redistribution, social legislation European Social Fund GATT Articles XIX-XXI);
and governmental supply of (Articles 123-125), consumer special and differential
other "public goods") protection rules (e.g., Article treatment for less-developed
129a), European Regional country members
Development Fund, etc.
*TEU = Treaty on European Union.
citizens in order to protect themselves against abuses of regulatory
powers by the EC and member state governments.
1. Rule of Law and Constitutionalism
The idea of an "empire of laws, not of men" (Harrington, 1656),
which had been developed already in Plato's proposals for a
"nomocracy" as a practical substitute for his utopian idea of a govern-
ment by "philosopher kings," is reflected in the explicit commitment
of the EC Treaties to "the rule of law" (for example, in the Preamble
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of the Treaty on European Union; hereinafter TEU) and in the man-
date of the EC Court to "ensure that in the interpretation and applica-
tion of this Treaty the law is observed" (Article 164 EC). In its case
law, the EC Court has recognized most national "rule of law" princi-
ples (such as legal certainty, protection of legitimate expectations,
non-discrimination, non-retroactivity and proportionality of restric-
tions) as general principles of EC law. Also the distinction between
constitutions of a higher legal rank and post-constitutional laws, first
elaborated by Aristotle and recognized in the constitutional laws of all
EC member states, has been recognized by the EC Court as part of
Community law; thus, according to the Court, "the European Eco-
nomic Community is a Community based on the rule of law, inasmuch
as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of
the question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity
with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty."53
2. Separation of Powers
The idea, again first developed by Plato and Aristotle, of separat-
ing government powers through a "mixed constitution" with mono-
cratic, oligocratic and democratic elements, so that "le pouvoir arrte
le pouvoir" (Montesquieu) underlies the horizontal separation of pow-
ers among the various EC institutions and the vertical separation of
powers between the EC, member states and the fundamental rights of
the "citizens of the Union" (cf. Article 8 EC). Thus, the EC Court has
recognized in a series of judgments "the Court's duty to ensure that
the provisions of the Treaties concerning the institutional balance are
fully applied and to see to it that the Parliament's prerogatives, like
those of the other institutions, cannot be breached without it having
available a legal remedy, among those laid down in the Treaties, which
may be exercised in a certain and effective manner."54 The principles
of limited Community powers and "subsidiarity" are explicitly laid
down in Article 3b of the EC Treaty.
3. Fundamental Rights
The limitation of all governmental powers through inalienable
fundamental rights, which has become the foundation stone of consti-
tutional democracies since the American Declaration of Indepen-
dence (1776) and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789),
is explicitly recognized in Article F of the TEU and in the unwritten
53 Case 294183, Parti Ecologiste "Les Verts" v. European Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339, 1365.
54 Case 70188, European Parliament v. Council, 1990 E.C.R. 2041, 2042.
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fundamental rights guarantees of EC law. One of the-major constitu-
tional achievements of EC law is to have extended these guarantees of
equal liberties and property rights to the field of transnational "mar-
ket freedoms" pursuant to the EC "principle of an open market econ-
omy with free competition" (Article 3a).
4. Necessity and Proportionality of Governmental Restraints
The additional limitation of governmental powers by the constitu-
tional requirements of the "necessity" and "proportionality" of gov-
ernmental restraints of individual liberties is explicitly recognized in
EC law (e.g., Article 3b EC) and in the case law of the EC Court of
Justice regarding the admissibility of governmental limitations on indi-
vidual freedoms. For instance, the "necessity" and "proportionality"
of national restrictions of intra-EC trade are, according to the EC
Court, unwritten conditions for the consistency of such restrictions
with Articles 30 or 36 of the EC Treaty.
5. Democracy
The "democratic functioning of the institutions" is the declared
objective of the TEU (cf. the Preainble), which also stipulates that the
national "systems of government are founded on the principles of de-
mocracy" (Article F). According to the EC Court, the powers of the
directly elected European Parliament reflect "at the Community level
the fundamental democratic principle that the peoples should take
part in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a represen-
tative assembly."'55 The EC Treaty provisions on the "citizenship of
the Union" (Article 8) recognize the nationals of member states as
legal subjects and citizens of the Union with individual political and
economic rights.
6. Social Justice
The constitutional principle of "social justice" is reflected in the
EC Treaty's "social provisions" (Articles 117 et seq.), which are
designed "to promote.., social progress for their peoples" (Preamble
TEU). The EC Treaty includes many other provisions for the supply
of "public goods" for the benefit of the "citizens of the Union" (Arti-
cle 8 EC Treaty).
55 Case 138/79, SA Roquette Freres v. Council, 1980 E.C.R. 3333, 3334.
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C. Constitutionalism and Worldwide International Organizations:
A Brief Survey
The above-mentioned constitutional principles are also increas-
ingly shaping the law of worldwide international organizations, such
as the UN, the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Bretton
Woods institutions and also the WTO. For instance:
1. Rule of Law and Constitutionalism
Objective rule of law principles - such as the UN Charter princi-
ples of "sovereign equality" of states, the prohibition of the threat or
use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention in mat-
ters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state
and self-determination - have become part of general international
law or even ius cogens. In the field of international trade law, the
GATr/WTO rules specify the general rule of law principles, such as
by means of worldwide requirements of non-discrimination (for exam-
ple, in Articles I, III, XIII, XVII GAIT), transparency (for example,
Article X GATI), peaceful settlement of disputes through the
mandatory WTO dispute settlement system and the prohibition of
unilateral reprisals (cf. Article XXIII:2 GATT, Articles 22, 23 Dispute
Settlement Understanding; hereinafter DSU). Both the UN Charter
(cf. Article 103) and, to a lesser extent, the WTO Agreement (cf. Arti-
cle XVI:3) assert priority over other international agreements so as to
strengthen their respective constitutional functions for the use of law-
ful and welfare-increasing instruments of foreign policy. The UN,
ILO, WTO and many other UN bodies and conventions set up institu-
tionalized supervisory mechanisms for the systematic monitoring of
the implementation of their international agreements in the domestic
law of member countries.
2. Separation of Powers
Horizontal and vertical institutional "checks and balances" are
one of the major objectives of international organizations, e.g., by sub-
jecting foreign policies, trade policies, monetary and social policies of
member countries to international supervision in different fora (such
as the UN, WTO, IMF and ILO) and to international procedures for
the rule-oriented rather than power-oriented settlement of interna-
tional disputes. While the judicial review of international decisions
like Security Council decisions by the International Court of Justice
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remains controversial,56 the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing explicitly states that it shall also apply to consultations and the
settlement of disputes between Members concerning their institu-
tional and membership rights and obligations under the provisions of
the WTO Agreement and the Dispute Settlement Understanding it-
self (cf. Article 1:1 of the DSU). Also the quasi-automatic adoption
by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of Panel and Appellate Body
Reports implies a discrete strengthening of separation of powers be-
tween WTO bodies and member states.
3. Fundamental Rights
In the UN Charter and in the increasing number of UN human
rights conventions, all members states have committed themselves to
"universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or
religion" (e.g., Articles 55, 56 UN Charter). The limitation of govern-
ment powers through legal guarantees of freedom and non-discrimi-
nation is the major purpose of the international GATTIWTO
guarantees of liberal trade in goods and services and of non-discrimi-
natory conditions of competition. By prohibiting governments from
discriminating among the more than 120 WTO member countries,
WTO law takes away more than 120 possibilities of governments to
discriminate among their own citizens through tariffs and non-tariff
barriers, and to thereby redistribute income for the benefit of protec-
tionist interest groups. The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRIPS) includes detailed guarantees of
copyrights, trademarks, industrial designs, patents and other intellec-
tual property rights, which have long been recognized and protected
by courts as individual rights. The WTO Agreement also includes a
large number of legal guarantees of private access to domestic courts
so as to enforce intellectual property and other rights of private citi-
zens. In other worldwide and regional organizations, such as the UN,
ILO and the Council of Europe, the worldwide and regional human
rights guarantees are increasingly contributing to the view that sys-
tematic violations of human rights and democracy may be inconsistent
with membership in such organizations. Thus, UN Security Council
Resolution 940 of 31 July 1994 considered the "deterioration of the
humanitarian situation in Haiti, in particular the continuing escalation
by the illegal de facto regime of systematic violations of civil liber-
ties," as a "threat to peace and security in the region" justifying a mili-
'56 See, eg., J.E. Alvarez, Judging the Security Council, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1996).
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tary intervention pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter aimed at
"the restoration of democracy in Haiti and the prompt return of the
legitimately elected President."
4. Necessity and Proportionality of Governmental Restraints
Necessity and proportionality requirements for governmental re-
straints of individual freedoms (including the freedom to import and
export) are to be found in a large number of international treaty pro-
visions such as in GAIT law (cf. Article XX GATT) and in the Gen-
eral Agreement of Trade in Services (for example, Articles VI, XIV
GATS). Also the legal ranking of admissible trade policy instruments
in GATT law in accordance with their economic efficiency - such as
the general admissibility of non-discriminatory internal taxes and reg-
ulations (Article III), the legal limitations on the use of subsidies (Ar-
ticle XVI) and tariffs (Articles II, XXVIII) and the general
prohibitions of non-tariff border measures (Article XI) - are aimed at
limiting the use of disproportionate and mutually harmful policy in-
struments. In many fields of international law (e.g., regarding repri-
sals and self-defence), the requirement of proportionality has become
recognized as a principle of general international law.
5. Democratic Participation
Democratic exercise of government powers is promoted by the
parliamentary ratification of international agreements (such as the
1994 WTO Agreement) and the increasing number of regional agree-
ments providing for parliamentary bodies (such as the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe and of the Organization for Coop-
eration and Security in Europe). While the word "democracy" is not
explicitly mentioned in the UN Charter, the UN's Universal 1948
Declaration of Human Rights makes clear that the legitimacy of gov-
ernments depends on free elections (cf. Article 21) and on promoting
the equal human rights and freedoms of all citizens (Article 29). The
number of international dispute settlement mechanisms providing for
direct access of private citizens is also increasing (for example, in UN
human rights conventions, the ILO, the 1968 World Bank Convention
on the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes, the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, the European Convention
on Human Rights); similar to the tripartite composition of ILO Bod-
ies with employers', workers' and governments' representatives, such
international treaty provisions on the participation of private citizens
in international organizations reflect the "democratic functions" of in-
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ternational liberal rules and organizations for the protection of indi-
vidual rights.
6. Social Justice
The promotion of social justice, for instance through the social
and labour standards in the more than 180 ILO Conventions, through
UN human rights conventions and the development aid of the World
Bank Group, is a declared policy objective and major task of interna-
tional organizations. The numerous safeguard clauses in GATT/WTO
law for national "public policy exceptions" (such as those in Articles
X-VIII-XXI GATT) also reflect the view that liberal trade agreements
must be reconciled with the sovereign right of governments to pursue
social policies that are considered more important than liberal trade.
V. PROBLEMS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
The worldwide trends towards protection of human rights, de-
mocracy, deregulation and the globalization of market economies sug-
gest that the above-mentioned "constitutionalization" of foreign
policies and of international organizations will continue. The entry
into force of the WTO Agreement on 1 January 1995 is a major
achievement on the road towards global economic integration based
on rule of law and democratic structures for the benefit of individual
citizens. The GATS, for instance, aims at liberalizing the high degree
of protectionist regulation of domestic services, as well as the
thousands of bilateral market-sharing agreements such as for interna-
tional air and maritime transport, by means of multilateral rules and
"GATS Rounds" similar to the progressive liberalization of trade in
goods in the framework of GATT. The proposals for following the
precedents of the GATS and TRIPS Agreements by extending the
coverage of the WTO Agreement to additional new subjects - such as
international competition, investment, environmental, social and la-
bour rules - suggest that many governments perceive the WTO as a
promising model for negotiating additional worldwide rules in these
fields.
History since World War II seems to confirm the liberal assump-
tions that constitutional democracies favour peaceful change in their
international relations, and that there is a clear interrelationship be-
tween economic freedom, open markets, economic growth and de-
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mocracy.5 7 It is therefore surprising that economics, law and political
science have so far failed to elaborate a convincing theory on the
legal-institutional requirements of a liberal international order and on
the optimal assignment of foreign policy tasks to the various interna-
tional organizations. The WTO Agreement has brought about a new
legal framework for a liberal world economy with many innovative
legal features, such as the compulsory WTO dispute settlement system
with Appellate Review. But it remains controversial whether the pro-
posals for additional international competition, investment, environ-
mental, labour and social rules should be pursued within the WTO or
in other international organizations. Perhaps the greatest weakness of
the international legal system remains that, as rightly criticized by UN
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, "democracy in the international
community of states remains at a very rudimentary stage.
'"5 8
Today's worldwide recognition of human rights as part of interna-
tional customary law and UN treaty law, including everyone's "right
to take part in the government of his country, directly or through
freely chosen representatives," and the need for periodic democratic
elections as "the basis of the authority of government" (cf. Article 21
of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights), offer an impor-
tant basis for further "constitutionalizing" and "democratizing" inter-
national relations and organizations. The acknowledgment, in the UN
Charter, of human rights as a precondition for international peace has
already prompted the UN Security Council to interpret its powers
under chapter VII in a broad sense for the protection of democratic
peace. Yet, without a convincing "constitutional theory" of interna-
tional relations, governments lack the necessary blueprint for over-
hauling the UN system. The actual preference of governments for
pragmatic piecemeal reforms on the basis of "trial and error" too
often leads to
tinkering with organizational charts, shifting financial envelopes, reor-
dering bureaucratic priorities, downsizing headquarters and field opera-
tions, streamlining managerial and administrative procedures, or oiling
the intergovernmental machine. While these issues might be considered
important, they have generally resulted in a concentration of focus on
reformist prescriptions that are limited and narrow in scope and superfi-
cial and short-term in vision and effect.5 9
57 See, e.g., J. GWARTNEY ET AL, ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF =HE WORLD: 1975-1995 (1996).
58 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Democracy: A Newly Recognized Imperative, 1 GLOBAL GOVERN-
ANCE 3, 10 (1995).
59 W.A. Knight, Beyond the UN System? Critical Perspectives on Global Governance and
Multilateral Evolution, 1 GLOBAL GovERNANcE 229, 251-52 (1995).
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A more comprehensive theory of international organizations would,
inter alia, have to offer answers to the following questions:
A. What Are the Legitimate Functions of International
Organizations?
International organizations are needed for essentially the same
reasons as national organizations (cf. Table 1), e.g., to correct "market
failures" as well as "government failures" and to assist in the supply of
"public goods."
First, international rules and organizations may be necessary for
correcting cross-border "market failures" such as transnational "exter-
nalities." For instance, the GATT rules on product standards (Article
III), antidumping duties (Article VI) and safeguard measures (e.g.,
Article XX) reserve the right of countries to protect themselves
against e.g., injurious imports notwithstanding their reciprocal market
access commitments under GATT law.
Second, international rules and organizations may be needed for
correcting "government failures" such as trade protectionism. For in-
stance, economic theory shows that unilateral trade liberalization in-
creases .the economic welfare of the liberalizing country. The main
reasons why governments prefer, nonetheless, to liberalize trade
through reciprocal agreements, rather than unilaterally, are political
and legal rather than economic:60 Reciprocal trade liberalization
agreements are the only way of guaranteeing export industries secure
access to foreign markets; export industries therefore prefer reciprocal
trade liberalization, and governments need this political support from
"their" export industries in order to overcome the protectionist resist-
ance against trade liberalization from import-competing producers at
home. Reciprocal international guarantees of freedom of trade and
non-discrimination therefore serve important domestic policy func-
tions for limiting government failures by helping governments to over-
come the asymmetries in their national foreign policy-making
processes. This also explains the high rate of "success" of GATT dis-
pute settlement rulings: Governments know very well that compliance
with their self-imposed GATT commitments, and with GAIT dispute
settlement rulings, increases national economic welfare; and that by
"tying their hands to the mast" (like Ulysses when he approached the
island of the Sirenes), reciprocal international pre-commitments help
60 For a detailed economic, political and legal explanation of this important insight see Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann, Why Do Governments Need the Uruguay Round Agreements, NAFTA and
the EEA?, 49 AUSSENWiRTSCHAFr [Swiss REV. INT'L ECON. REL.] 31 (1994).
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them to resist the siren-like temptations from "rent-seeking" interest
groups at home.
Third, international organizations may be necessary to assist in
the supply of international public goods. For instance, according to
various economic estimates, the implementation of the WTO Agree-
ment is likely to increase net world welfare by more than 250 billion
U.S. dollars over the next years. Without the most-favoured-nation
obligation in GATT Article I, the "multilateralization" of the Uru-
guay Round results among the 124 participating countries would re-
quire several thousand bilateral agreements to achieve the same legal
effect. International "regime theories" emphasize that international
institutions, supervisory and dispute settlement mechanisms can help
to overcome the "prisoners' dilemma" of international cooperation
61
and reduce "free riding," for instance through the formation of
"clubs" for the collective supply of international public goods (such as
trade liberalization) by means of collective rule-making (e.g., in the
periodic "GATT Rounds"), institutionalized monitoring of rule-com-
pliance (e.g., in GATT's "Trade Policy Review Mechanism"), confi-
dence-building measures (e.g., transparency and dispute settlement
requirements) and sanctions against "free-riders" (e.g., limitation of
agreed trade liberalization to member countries, suspension of conces-
sions in response to infringements of GATT rules).6'
But there are also many reasons why international organizations,
or the transfer of discretionary regulatory powers to them, may be
unnecessary or undesirable. For instance, international rules and or-
ganizations are easier to justify when they promote freedom, non-dis-
crimination and market integration across frontiers, than in the case of
discretionary international policy integration which, due to inadequate
61 International relations theory uses the game of the Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) in order to
exemplify why cooperation is often difficult to achieve without adequate information and confi-
dence even though all players would benefit from such cooperation. The PD relates to the tale
of two guilty prisoners suspected of a major crime. If the public prosecutor has only enough
evidence to convict them of a misdemeanor, each prisoner will benefit if neither confesses the
crime. To elicit confessions, the public prosecutor can create the PD by separating the prisoners
(e.g., preventing information and cooperation among them) and offering each the following deal:
If either prisoner confesses while the other does not, all charges against the confessor will be
dropped, while the non-confessor will receive the maximum possible sentence. Game theory
shows that these incentives will typically induce confession by both prisoners, resulting in high
prison sentences which could have been avoided by cooperation and silence.
62 For a survey of the various "realist," "neoliberal," "functional," "public choice" and "con-
stitutional" theories of international relations, and their relevance for explaining GATI and the
WTO, see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, supra note 26, at 161-221, and A.M. Slaugther, Liberal In-
ternational Relations Theory and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
717-743 (1995).
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constitutional restraints, may increase the risk of government failures
(as in the example of the EC's common agricultural policy). Also,
multilateral trade negotiations are often abused for welfare-reducing,
restrictive arrangements, rather than for mutually beneficial trade
liberalization.
Article III of the WTO Agreement illustrates the various func-
tions of international organizations by assigning the following five
tasks to the WTO:
1. The WTO shall facilitate the implementation, administration and op-
eration, and further the objectives, of this Agreement and of the Multi-
lateral Trade Agreements, and shall also provide the framework for the
implementation, administration and operation of the Plurilateral
Agreements.
2. The WTO shall provide the forum for negotiations among its Mem-
bers concerning their multilateral trade relations in matters dealt with
under the agreements in the Annexes to this Agreement. The WTO
may also provide a forum for further negotiations among its Members
concerning their multilateral trade relations, and a framework for the
implementation of the results of such negotiations, as may be decided by
the Ministerial Conference.
3. The WTO shall administer the Understanding on Rules and Proce-
dures Governing the Settlement of Disputes . . .in Annex 2 to this
Agreement.
4. The WTO shall administer the Trade Policy Review Mechanism...
provided for in Annex 3 to this Agreement.
5. With a view to achieving greater coherence in global economic policy-
making, the WTO shall cooperate, as appropriate, with the International
Monetary Fund and with the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and its affiliated agencies.
This statutory definition shows that the WTO - similar to the old
"GATTI 1947," which was terminated with effect from the end of 1995
- has not only administrative and executive tasks, plus surveillance,
dispute settlement and coordination functions, but also negotiating
and rule-making functions. The vast scope of jurisdiction of the W'TO
not only for trade in goods, but also for trade in services, trade-related
investment measures and intellectual property rights, can be legiti-
mized by the legal and economic functions of liberal trade rules to
protect equal individual rights in a mutually beneficial manner in-
creasing consumer welfare. Likewise, the application of the WTO
Agreement not only to states but also to "separate customs territo-
ries" (like Hong Kong, Macao and the EC, cf. Articles XI, XII WTO
Agreement), is legitimized by the fact that this extended scope of ap-
plication increases the scope for mutually beneficial cooperation.
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From the above-mentioned Lockean and Kantian perspectives,
however, the legitimacy of the tasks assigned to the WTO, and to
other national and international organizations, depends on the extent
to which they promote the equal liberties and individual rights of do-
mestic citizens. Most GATr/WTO rules are designed to protect free-
dom of trade, non-discriminatory conditions of competition,
investment and individual property rights. By extending the national
legal protection of individual liberties and non-discrimination across
frontiers, they serve "constitutional functions" for the benefit of do-
mestic consumers, traders and producers. Moreover, the GATT/
WTO rules have been ratified by national parliaments in most WTO
member countries and have thereby acquired additional democratic
legitimacy.
But the legitimacy of GATT/WTO rules may be challenged if
they authorize restrictions and distortions of individual freedoms (e.g.,
in Article VI GATT on anti-dumping measures against "dumped" im-
ports causing or threatening "material injury to an established indus-
try") which reduce consumer welfare and redistribute income among
domestic groups in a discriminatory and often non-transparent man-
ner.6" And if, as in the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, the admissi-
bility of import restrictions is conditional on procedural and
substantive "public interest" requirements, the question arises: How
must such procedural and substantive requirements be interpreted in
order to define the "public interest" in a legitimate manner? Is a
"Hobbesian interpretation" of the national "foreign policy interest,"
e.g., a power-oriented determination of the "primacy of foreign pol-
icy" without regard to the general consumer interests in non-discrimi-
natory liberal trade, consistent with the liberal functions of the
international guarantees of freedom and non-discrimination in GATT/
WTO law?
The explicit mandate of the WTO as a negotiating forum, empha-
sized in Article III of the WTO Agreement, reflects the widely shared
belief of governments that it may be politically easier to negotiate fu-
ture trade, competition, environmental, investment, social rules or in-
tellectual property rights in the context of comprehensive "WTO
package deals" than outside the WTO, where it may be more difficult
to offer cross-concessions in other fields and exclude "free-riding."
But the various "realist," "neoliberal" and "functional" theories of in-
ternational relations have not yet developed a model for successful
63 On the mutual inconsistency of antidumping and competition rules in the EC and the
United States, see Petersmann, supra note 18, at 5.
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international bargaining and "institution-building." Nor do we have
convincing institutional theories on e.g., how to reform the UN
system.
B. How to Ensure that International Rules and Organizations Do
Not Undermine the Requirements of Constitutional
Democracy?
From the national perspective of constitutional democracies and
their citizens, international organizations can be viewed as a "fourth
branch of government" which, like national organizations, derive their
legitimacy from promoting the equal liberties and "public interest" of
domestic citizens. It is therefore important to ensUre that interna-
tional agreements do not undermine the basic constitutional principles
of democracies. For instance, the domestic constitutional principles of
parliamentary and direct democracy (e.g., in Switzerland) may require
that the rules negotiated among governments in the framework of in-
ternational organizations (such as the Uruguay Round Agreements)
be ratified by national parliaments and subjected to popular referenda
by domestic citizens. Effective international rule-making must there-
fore be supplemented by democratic procedures on the international
and domestic levels of policy-making. It may be enhanced by enabling
parliaments and public opinion to be fully informed already during
the intergovernmental negotiations at the international level so as to
preempt "democratic opposition" in the subsequent ratification
processes at the national level.
After the domestic ratification of international rules, their effec-
tive integration into the respective domestic legal systems raises nu-
merous legal and political questions. The domestic constitutional
guarantees of fundamental rights, democracy, proportionality and rule
of law may not only require that domestic law be construed in con-
formity with self-imposed international obligations; they may also re-
quire that the international GAT/TWTO guarantees of freedom and
non-discrimination be interpreted, as parts of the respective domestic
legal system, in a "Lockean" or even "Kantian" perspective so as to
maximize the equal rights of domestic citizens, e.g., by enabling them
to invoke and enforce precise, unconditional international guarantees
of freedom and non-discrimination through domestic courts. But for
reasons of international reciprocity, domestic courts often prefer to
construe international agreements as they are applied by the interna-
tional treaty organs or by other contracting parties. The procedure in
Article 177 of the EC Treaty for preliminary rulings, at the request of
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national courts, by the EC Court concerning the interpretation of EC
law is one illustration of how national and international dispute settle-
ment procedures can be effectively coordinated. The dispute settle-
ment panels pursuant to chapter 19 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, which can review national antidumping and counter-
vailing duty determinations on the basis of the applicable domestic
law of the NAFTA member country concerned, offer another method
for reconciling international and domestic trade rules and dispute
settlement procedures.
It seems doubtful, however, whether national parliaments should
be granted the power to introduce legislation inconsistent with inter-
national obligations previously ratified by themselves. Such a power-
oriented later-in-time rule is not only inconsistent with the interna-
tional rule of law; it also seems unnecessary in view of the many pos-
sibilities of terminating or adjusting international obligations.
Moreover, the U.S. experience suggests that a "later in time rule" op-
erates as an invitation for protectionist interest groups to lobby for
subsequent legislative deviations from the previous international com-
mitments. The flexibility of international law enables each country to
defend its national interests in conformity with international law, e.g.,
by giving parliaments a stronger role in international treaty-making
procedures, or by terminating or suspending international treaty obli-
gations in response to treaty violations by other contracting parties.
In the EC, international agreements concluded by the EC become an
"integral part of the Community legal system" with legal primacy over
secondary EC law; hence, neither the EC Council nor the European
Parliament are empowered to violate international agreements of the
EC. The EC institutions must also respect international agreements
that have been concluded by EC member states prior to their EC
membership (cf. Article 234 EC Treaty) or as "mixed agreements" rat-
ified by both the EC and its member states.
C. How to Design International Rule-Making, Rule-
Administration and Adjudication in a Manner Maximizing
the Equal Rights of Member Countries and of
their Citizens?
Not only within states, but also among the about 200 sovereign
states are rule-making, rule-application and rule-enforcement proce-
dures necessary. These procedures often differ depending on whether
they relate to general customary or treaty rules for voluntary coopera-
tion among states, or to result-oriented "secondary treaty law"
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adopted by the bodies of international organizations. For instance,
the rules of the old "GATT 1947" could be enforced through the
GATT dispute settlement procedures only in the relations among
GATT contracting parties. The dispute settlement procedures of the
WTO also apply to disputes over the institutional provisions of the
WTO Agreement (cf. Article 1 DSU) and enable the appeal of WTO
panel reports to a standing Appellate Body (cf. Article 17 DSU). The
establishment of this Appellate Body reflects a discrete strengthening
of separation of powers in international organizations.
As regards international rule-making, modern negotiation theo-
ries, constitutional theories and "public choice" theories emphasize
the need for "principled negotiations"'64 and for creating incentives
(such as a "veil of uncertainty" over future positions, repetitive bar-
gaining and "tit-for-tat-strategies" of reciprocal cooperation) 65 which
induce people and governments to focus on their common long-term
interests in general rules and fair procedures. But little research has
so far been done on the interdependences between rule-making pro-
cedures, institutional law and the respective substantive tasks. It is an
important experience of European integration that rule-making may
be greatly facilitated by the right of initiative of an independent expert
body (like the EC Commission). In the Uruguay Round negotiations,
for instance, international agreement on the new rules was sometimes
facilitated by draft and compromise proposals from the GATT Secre-
tariat which "mediated" between conflicting proposals from govern-
ment delegations, or which initiated discussions on systemic problems
rising from the hundreds of specific negotiating proposals (e.g., discus-
sions on the institutional framework necessary for implementing the
Uruguay Round results). The GATS and TRIPS Agreements are
also evidence of the fact that the rule-making procedures of the
GAT/WTO (e.g., "global package deals") may enable results that
were never possible in sectoral organizations (like WIPO and the In-
ternational Telecommunications Union) or in UN bodies like the UN
Conference on Trade and Development.
Another lesson from the EC and from other international organi-
zations is that transparency, and advisory committees with representa-
64 On the method and advantages of "principled negotiation," in contrast to "positional bar-
gaining," see ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YEs: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
wrrHOUT GIViNG IN (1983); ROGER FISHER & ScoTT BROWN, GETTING TOGETHER: BUILDINo
A RELATIONSHIP THAT GETS TO YES (1988).
65 See, e.g., BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 14, at 28, 79; ROBERT AXELROD, THE
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 173 (1984); HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGO-
TIATION 12 (1982).
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tives from non-governmental organizations, can strengthen the
political acceptability of international rule-making.
The WTO Agreement includes also a large number of provisions
on international notifications of domestic implementing laws and on
the institutionalized supervision of their domestic implementation. As
no legislator can foresee all the actual effects of legislation upon the
autonomous actions of individuals and of other governments, and
rules do not enforce themselves, the effectiveness of rule-oriented in-
ternational cooperation often depends on international procedures for
the agreed interpretation of the international rules, and for the peace-
ful settlement of disputes over their application at the international
and national levels. One of the major reasons for incorporating the
GATS and TRIPS rules into WTO law was the view of governments
that the "integrated" WTO dispute settlement and enforcement rules
are more effective than those in sectoral agreements (e.g., under the
authority of WIPO). National and international trade law, notably in
federal states and in the EC, has been shaped by case law, and often
developed through judicial protection of individual rights. In the EC's
common market law, the five "market freedoms" (for goods, services,
persons, capital and payments) were effectively enforced by the EC
Court as individual freedoms of EC citizens.
A rights-based approach, enabling self-interested individuals to
enforce international guarantees of freedom and non-discrimination
through the courts, has likewise enabled a dynamic evolution of the
European Convention on Human Rights. As stated by the European
Court of Human Rights in the Golder Case, "in civil matters one can
scarcely conceive of the rule of law without there being a possibility of
having access to the courts;" the "principle whereby a civil claim must
be capable of being submitted to a judge ranks as one of the univer-
sally recognised fundamental principles of law."'66 The very small
number of complaints among member state governments at the EC
Court, as well as at the European Court of Human Rights, confirms
that individuals, interested in protecting their freedom and non-dis-
crimination through invoking international treaty obligations and judi-
cial remedies, may be the best guardians and promoters of rule-
oriented international cooperation.
66 57 INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 201, 217 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 1980).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 17:398 (1996-97)
VI. THE WTO AGREEMENT AS A GLOBAL INTEGRATION
AGREEMENT
The non-ratification of the 1948 Havana Charter for an Interna-
tional Trade Organization left the post-war "international economic
constitution," based on the 1944 Bretton Woods agreements and the
"GAIT 1947," incomplete. The progressive transformation of the
GATT - from a provisional short-term contract on the reciprocal lib-
eralization of tariffs into a complex long-term system of more than 200
multilateral trade agreements6 7 with comprehensive institutions and
decision-making powers - could fill only part of this "constitutional
gap." In many areas not covered by GATT law - such as international
movements of services, persons and capital - the sectoral compart-
mentalization of international economic law favoured the re-emer-
gence of the pre-war problems of bilateralism, sectoral market-sharing
agreements (e.g., for international air and shipping transport), monop-
olies, cartelization and other forms of protectionism. Even in areas
covered by GATT law - such as trade in agricultural, steel and tex-
tiles products - governments often gave in to protectionist pressures
for departures from their GATr obligations of open markets and non-
discriminatory competition. This welfare-reducing trade protection-
ism reflected a "government failure" to fulfil the legitimate tasks of
governments to protect the general interest of their citizens in liberal
trade and rule of law. The sectoral erosion of the GATT legal disci-
plines for liberal trade also revealed broader "constitutional failures"
of national and international economic law.68 It confirmed once again
that legal guarantees of freedom and non-discrimination cannot re-
main effective, either at the national or at the international level, un-
less they are placed into a constitutional framework of institutional
"checks and balances" and judicial protection-of individual freedoms
against protectionist abuses of governmental powers.
The WTO Agreement, adopted by 124 countries and the EC on
15 April 1994, is not only the longest agreement ever concluded (com-
prising some 25,000 pages) but also the most important worldwide
agreement since the UN Charter of 1945. It comprises a preamble
and 16 Articles regulating the scope and functions of the WTO, its
institutional structure, legal status and relations with other organiza-
tions, decision-making procedures and membership. Its legal com-
plexity derives from the additional 29 .Agreements and
67 See GATT STATUS OF LEGAL INSTRUMENTS (GATr Secretariat ed., 1993).
68 For an interdisciplinary analysis of protectionism as "government failure" and "constitu-
tional failure" see PETERSMANN, supra note 4, at ch. V and VI.
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Understandings listed in the 4 Annexes to the WTO Agreement,
69
and from its inclusion in the "Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations," which was
adopted by 124 governments and the EC on 15 April 1994 and in-
cludes 28 further Ministerial Decisions, Declarations and one Under-
standing related to the Uruguay Round Agreements.
As a global integration agreement, which regulates international
movements of goods, services, persons, capital and related payments
in an integrated manner, the WTO Agreement reduces the current
fragmentation of separate international agreements and organizations
for movements of goods, services, persons, capital and payments (see
Table 4). Fifty years after the Bretton Woods Conference, its entry
into force on 1 January 1995 completed the legal structure of the Bret-
ton Woods system based on the IMF, the World Bank Group and the
WTO. Even more so than the IMF and the World Bank, whose stat-




Levels of Goods Services Persons Capital Payments
Regulation
National eg., economic freedoms, contract law, private property rights and
Private Law commercial arbitration as legal preconditions of an international
division of labour
National eg., constitutional rules, human rights, general economic laws,
Public Law regulations and organizations
International e.g., e.g., e.g., e.g., e.g.,
Public Law GATT, ICAO, ILO, IBRD, IMF,
EFTA ITU OECD ICSID GATT
e.g., 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement Establishing the WTO, EEA
and NAFTA Agreements
Supranational e.g., EC Treaty, European Union Treaty, general principles of EC
EC Law law
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS AS A "LAYERED SYSTEM"
(International Economic Law in the broad sense comprising of private and public,
national and international legal regulations of the interdependent economic
activities)
69 See THE RESuLTs OF THE URUGUAY RouND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS:
Tin LEGAL TEXTS (GATT Secretariat ed., 1994). The more than 100 tariff schedules on trade in
goods were published by the WTO in 27 volumes. The GATS and the schedules of services
commitments were published in 3 additional volumes. See 1-31 URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTI-
LATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS EMBODYING THE RESULT OF THE URU-
GUAY RouND, GATT (1994).
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utes include only few substantive rules for the conduct of governmen-
tal policies and for the rule-oriented settlement of international
disputes, the WTO was designed to also serve constitutional functions
(below A) and rule-making functions (B), in addition to its executive
functions, surveillance functions and dispute settlement functions (C)
for the foreign economic policies of member states.
A. Constitutional Functions of the WTO Agreement
As a new global framework agreement for the conduct of trade-
related policies, the WTO Agreement sets out the basic rights and
duties of its member countries and lays the legal foundation for a new
international economic order for the 21st century. Its "constitutional
functions" for limiting discretionary trade policy powers of govern-
ments through worldwide, long-term rules of a higher legal rank are
reflected, inter alia, in the following provisions:
1. The "single undertaking approach"
The WTO Agreement incorporates the following 29 Agreements
and Understandings listed in Annexes 1 to 4:
- ANNEX IA: MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS ON TRADE IN GOODS
- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, supplemented by 6
Understandings on Articles II:1(b), XII, XVII, XVIII, XXIV,
XXV and XXVIII and by the 'Marrakesh Protocol to the GATT
1994,'
- Agreement on Agriculture,
- Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures,
- Agreement on Textiles and Clothing,
- Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade,
- Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures,
- Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,
- Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,
- Agreement on Preshipment Inspection,
- Agreement on Rules of Origin,
- Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures,
- Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
Agreement on Safeguards;
- Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services and Annexes
- Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights
- Annex 2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes
- Annex 3: Trade Policy Review Mechanism
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- Annex 4: Plurilateral Trade Agreements
- Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft,
- Agreement on Government Procurement,
- International Dairy Agreement, and
- International Bovine Meat Agreement.
The WTO Agreement has thus created a highly complex, multi-
layered legal system (cf. Table 5). The objective of integrating all
these agreements into one single legal framework is explained in the
Preamble:
Resolved ... to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilat-
eral trading system, encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, the results of past trade liberalization efforts, and all of the
results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
The reference in the Preamble to the aim of "the optimal use of the
world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable de-
velopment, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and
to enhance the means for doing so," likewise reflects the comprehen-
sive "integration goals" of the WTO Agreement. Legally, the "single
undertaking approach" is made effective through Article 11:2 and 3:
2. The agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes
1, 2 and 3 (hereinafter referred to as 'Multilateral Trade Agreements')
are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members.
3. The agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4
(hereinafter referred to as 'Plurilateral Trade Agreements') are also part
of this Agreement for those Members that have accepted them, and are
binding on those Members. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not
create either obligations or rights for Members that have not accepted
them.
The institutional consequence of this is made explicit in Article II1::
1. The WTO shall provide the common institutional framework for the
conduct of trade relations among its Members in matters related to the
agreements and associated legal instruments included in the Annexes to
this Agreement.
The single undertaking approach is further extended by Article
XI:1, according to which "original membership" is limited to the "con-
tracting parties to GATT 1947 as of the date of entry into force of this
Agreement, and the European Communities, which accept this
Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements and for which
Schedules of Concessions and Commitments are annexed to GATT
1994 and for which Schedules of Specific Commitments are annexed to
GATS" (emphasis added). This additional condition of WTO mem-
bership, which also applies to accessions (Article XII), was agreed
upon only at a late stage in the Uruguay Round negotiations in order
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Table 5: The 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (WTO)
AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WTO
Multilateral General Agreement Agreement on Trade- Plurilateral Trade
Agreements on Trade on Trade in Services Related Aspects of Agreement (Annex 4)
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Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (Annex 2)
Trade Policy Review Mechanism (Annex 3)
WTO as a Negotiating Forum for Additional Rules (Ministerial Decisions)
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to remedy two structural weaknesses of the old "GATT A la carte"
system, namely:
- non-participation by more than two-thirds of GATT contracting par-
ties in the 1979 Tokyo Round Agreements, leading to a "fragmentation"
of GATT rights and obligations; and
- avoidance of substantive trade liberalization commitments by many
less-developed countries, which undertook only few commitments in
their respective GATT schedules of concessions.
"Free-riding," which was widespread under the "GATIT la
carte" system because non-signatories of the Tokyo-Round Agree-
ments benefited from them due to GATIT's most-favoured-nation ob-
ligation and due to the frequent practical need to apply import
regulations uniformly, has thus been significantly reduced by the sin-
gle undertaking approach and membership requirements of WTO law.
2. Termination of "GATT 1947" as an incentive for
joining the WTO
In contrast to the old GATT, which lacked explicit institutional
provisions because it had been conceived as a provisional agreement
to be integrated into the 1948 Havana Charter (cf. Article XXIX),70
the legal status of the WTO as an international organization with legal
personality is clearly established (Articles I, VIII). According to Arti-
cle 11:4,
[t]he General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as specified in An-
nex 1A (hereinafter referred to as "GATI" 1994") is legally distinct from
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 30 October 1947 .. ,
as subsequently rectified, amended or modified (hereinafter referred to
as "GATr 1947").
This method of making the new "GATT 1994" legally distinct
from the old "GATT 1947" was part of the strategy to exclude "free-
riding" and to replace the old GATT by a new WTO. In a Decision
adopted at the Implementation Conference on 8 December 1994, it
was agreed that
the stability of multilateral trade relations would.., be furthered if the
GATT 1947 and the WTO Agreement were to co-exist for a limited pe-
riod of time;
70 On the establishment of all necessary GAIT organs in GAT' practice, the pragmatic
servicing of the GATT by the staff of the Interim Commission for the International Trade Or-
ganization (ICITO) established in 1948 to prepare the entry into force of the ITO Charter, and
the evolution of GATT into an international organization with comprehensive decision-making
and treaty-making powers, see JOHN JACKSON, REs-ucruRiNG Ti GAT SYSTEM (1990).
See also 2 GAT' ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUmE TO GAT' LAW-AND PRACrICE, 1085-1133 (1995).
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.. during that period of co-existence, a contracting party which has
become a Member of the WTO should not be under a legal obligation to
extend the benefits accruing solely under the WTO Agreement to con-
tracting parties that have not yet become WTO members and should
have the right to act in accordafice with the WTO Agreement notwith-
standing its obligations under the GATT 1947;
... The legal instruments through which the contracting parties apply
the GATT 1947 are herewith terminated one year after the date of entry
into force of the WTO Agreement. In the light of unforeseen circum-
stances, the CONTRACTING PARTIES may decide to postpone the
date of termination by no more than one year.
71
This termination of the GAIT 1947 at the end of 1994 (with effect
from the end of 1995), and the GATT "waivers" granted in this Deci-
sion enabling GAIT member countries to limit the benefits under the
WTO Agreement to WTO members, entailed another threat against
"free-riders:" the contracting parties of GAIT 1947 were faced with
the choice of either joining the WTO Agreement or of finding them-
selves outside the world trading system without legally secure access
to foreign markets.
Notwithstanding the legal separation and termination of the
GATT 1947, the GATT provisions, and the legal instruments and de-
cisions adopted by the GATr contracting parties, were incorporated
into the "GATT 1994" by reference in Annex 1A of the WTO Agree-
ment. This legal continuity is also reflected in many other WTO pro-
visions. For instance, Article IX of the WTO Agreement enjoins the
WTO to "continue the practice of decision-making by consensus fol-
lowed under GATT 1947." And Article 3 of the WTO's dispute set-
tlement understanding affirms the members' "adherence to the
principles for the management of disputes heretofore applied under
Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1947, and the rules and procedures
as further elaborated and modified herein."
3. Legal primacy of the WTO Agreement over other international
trade agreements
According to Article XVI:3 of the WTO Agreement, "(i)n the
event of a conflict between a provision of this Agreement and a provi-
sion of any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the provisions of
this Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict." The vari-
ous Multilateral Trade Agreements include a number of additional
71 Decision of 8 December 1994 adopted by the Preparatory Committee for the WTO and
the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947, doc. PC/12, J7583.
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rules on possible "conflicts of law." For instance, the general interpre-
tative note at the beginning of Annex 1A states:
In the event of conflict between a provision of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994 and a provision of another agreement in An-
nex IA to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
..., the provision of the other agreement shall prevail to the extent of
the conflict.
As a consequence, the VTO Agreement and the Multilateral
Trade Agreements on goods other than the GATT 1994 prevail over
any conflicting provisions in the GATT 1994. For instance, according
to Article 2:4 of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Stan-
dards (SPS):
Sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to the relevant provi-
sions of this Agreement shall be presumed to be in accordance with the
obligations of the Members under the provisions of GATT 1994 which
relate to the use of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, in particular the
provisions of Article XX(b).
The WTO Agreement on Safeguards prohibits certain "orderly
marketing arrangements" including "actions under agreements, ar-
rangements and understandings entered into by two or more Mem-
bers" (Article 11). Various Multilateral Trade Agreements, as well as
the GAIT and the TRIPS Agreements, include references to other
international agreements concluded outside the GAIT/VITO frame-
work. The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Stan-
dards, for instance, requires members to "base their sanitary or
phytosanitary measures on international standards" (Article 3), and
defines the latter by reference to international agreements like the
International Plant Protection Convention (see Annex A to the SPS
Agreement). Also, the GAIT 1994 asserts legal priority over, and
prescribes legal limitations for, e.g., free-trade areas, customs unions
and any "interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs
union or of a free trade area" (Article XXIV), as well as for intergov-
ernmental commodity agreements (Article XX,g).
In view of the very large number of international agreements in-
corporated into the VITO Agreement or referred to e.g., in the GATS
and TRIPS Agreements, the WTO rules on the legal hierarchy among
these agreements are of constitutional significance for avoiding con-
flicts of laws in international relations.
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4. Institutions and decision-making powers for overcoming the
"prisoners' dilemma" of international cooperation
The institutions and decision-making powers of the WTO reflect
the goal of inducing countries to take a broader "systemic view" of
their general interests and to avoid mutually harmful, non-cooperative
behavior. Under the old "GATT h la carte" system, the separate legal
standing, and different membership, of the GATT 1947 and of the
1979 Tokyo Round Agreements entailed the possibility of legal and
institutional conflicts; the GAIT Council, for example, had no author-
ity over the interpretation of the Tokyo Round Agreements, and e.g.,
the minimum prices prescribed in the Tokyo Round Dairy Arrange-
ment deviated from the general GATT rules. Moreover, decision-
making in the specialized committees under the Tokyo Round Agree-
ments was often influenced by narrow sectoral interests; thus, dispute
settlement reports on anti-dumping measures were regularly adopted
when elaborated in the general GAIT dispute settlement procedures
and submitted to the GAIT Council, but mostly blocked when elabo-
rated in the special dispute settlement procedure under the Anti-
dumping Agreement and submitted to the Anti-dumping Commit-
tee.72 Under the WTO Agreement, by contrast, the Ministerial Con-
ference has "the authority to take decisions on all matters under any
of the Multilateral Trade Agreements" (Article IV:1) so as to ensure
the overall consistency of. decision-making in the VTO. In the inter-
vals between meetings of the Ministerial Conference, the General
Council shall conduct the functions of the Ministerial Conference.
This central and high-level jurisdiction is likely to induce governments
to focus more on their general interests and to balance the sectoral
interests involved. The General Council also discharges the responsi-
bilities of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and of the Trade Policy
Review Mechanism (Article IV:2-4) for all covered agreements.
As indicated above, Article III defines five functions of the WTO
as: a "framework for the implementation, administration and opera-
tion" of the VTO Agreement; a "forum for negotiations among its
Members concerning their multilateral trade relations;" an integrated
dispute settlement system for clarifying and enforcing the rules; a
"Trade Policy Review Mechanism" for promoting transparency, a bet-
ter understanding of trade policies of member states and rule-compli-
ance; and an institution for "achieving greater coherence in global
72 See Ernst-Ulich Petersmann, International Competition Rules for the GATTIWTO World
Trade and Legal System, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 35, 68-75 (December 1993).
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economic policy-making" in cooperation with the IMF and the World
Bank Group. These comprehensive rule-making, executive, coordina-
tion, dispute settlement and surveillance functions of the WTO are
based on the constitutional insight that the negotiation and effective-
ness of worldwide rules depend on supplementary institutions and
procedures for overcoming the "prisoners' dilemma" of international
cooperation.
5. Worldwide legal guarantees of freedom, non-discrimination
and rule of law
Most WTO rules are designed to promote freedom and non-dis-
criminatory conditions of competition for importers, exporters, produ-
cers, investors and consumers in international trade with goods and
services. The gist of the numerous Multilateral Trade Agreements on
goods, incorporated into Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement, is to give
further precision to strengthen and supplement the general GATT
guarantees of freedom of trade and non-discrimination, especially
with regard to agricultural, textiles and "grey area" trade restrictions
(such as "voluntary export restraints" and "orderly marketing ar-
rangements") which have escaped effective GATT legal disciplines for
a long time. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
extends liberal framework rules and procedures for periodic "GATS
Rounds" of multilateral liberalization to international trade in
services.
The TRIPS Agreement explicitly recognizes in its preamble "that
intellectual property rights are private rights." Its provisions on copy-
rights and related rights, trademarks, geographical indications, indus-
trial designs, patents, layout designs of integrated circuits and
protection of undisclosed information also include guarantees for the
private enforcement of these individual rights through civil, adminis-
trative and court procedures. Also, many other WTO agreements in-
clude requirements of private access to domestic courts (e.g., in
GATT Article X:3, Article 13 Antidumping Agreement, Article 23
Subsidies Agreement). They confirm, thereby, their ultimate function
to protect the rights of private citizens.
B. Rule-Making Functions of the WTO Agreement
One of the major functions of "GATT 1947" has been to serve as
a forum for bilateral and multilateral negotiations on rule-making.
The eight GATT Rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, for exam-
ple, led to a large number of additional trade agreements on the liber-
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alization of tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers. Similarly, the GATS
envisages the progressive liberalization of international trade in serv-
ices through successive "GATS Rounds" and multilateral agreements
on services trade. According to Article 111:2 of the V/TO Agreement,
the WTO may also provide a forum for further negotiations among its
members on other aspects of their multilateral trade relations. Article
9 of the V/TO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, for
instance, requests the Council for Trade in Goods to consider
"whether this Agreement should be complemented with provisions on
investment policy and competition policy." The broad coverage of the
WTO facilitates "package deal negotiations" behind a "veil of uncer-
tainty" by linking issues concerning different subject matters, and by
making progress in one area conditional on progress in another area
("overall reciprocity"), as in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations 1986-1994.
The old GATT 1947 was based on the legal principle of decision-
making "by a majority of the votes cast" (GAT Article XXV) and on
the practice of decision-making by consensus. In the V/TO, the "prac-
tice of decision-making by consensus" (Article IX:1 WTO Agree-
ment) and the majority requirements (e.g., for interpretations and
waivers) have been tightened so as to better accommodate concerns
with. protecting national sovereignty and preventing imbalances in
rights and obligations. The general principle underlying these rules is
that the WTO does not have the power, to impose new trade policy
obligations. Amendments therefore require either acceptance by all
members (Article X:2) or, if acceptance by two thirds of the members
is sufficient, shall take effect only for the members that have accepted
them unless otherwise provided (cf. Article X:3-5). The experience
with GATT 1947, which was formally amended the last time in 1965 to
introduce Part IV on "Trade and Development," suggests that the fu-
ture development of WTO law may likewise be based on the negotia-
tion of additional GAIT and GATS commitments and supplementary
Plurilateral Trade Agreements rather than on formal amendments of
the WTO Agreement. A "building block approach" of negotiating
additional Plurilateral Trade Agreements (e.g., on investment, compe-
tition and environmental rules), beginning with a limited number of
like-minded countries, could again lead to a "WTO A la carte" system.
This might later prompt WTO countries to repeat the Uruguay Round
approach and replace the V/TO Agreement by a new agreement.
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C. Executive, Surveillance and Dispute-Settlement Functions of
the WTO Agreement
According to Article III of the WTO Agreement, the WTO shall
facilitate the implementation, administration and operation of the
covered agreements. It shall also administer the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism (TPRM) and cooperate with other intergovernmental and
non-governmental organizations (cf. Article V). The various execu-
tive tasks are assigned to the WTO Secretariat and to a complex insti-
tutional system of specialized Councils, Committees and other
subsidiary bodies, under the general authority of the Ministerial Con-
ference and the General Council.
The WTO shall continue the practice of decision-making by con-
sensus followed under GAIT 1947 (Article IX:1 WTO Agreement).
But where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter at
issue shall be decided by voting. Consensus as a rule, rather than as a
practice, is prescribed for the addition of further "Plurilateral Trade
Agreements" to Annex 4, for amendments of the dispute settlement
rules (Article X:8), as well as for decision-making by the DSB (cf.
Article 2:4 DSU) subject to the proviso that "a panel shall be estab-
lished" (cf. Article 6:1 DSU), and panel or Appellate Body reports
"shall be adopted by the DSB," unless the DSB decides by "negative
consensus" not to take such decisions (cf. Articles 6,16, and 17 of the
DSU). Each WTO member shall have one vote except for the EC
which, although a full member of the WTO, shall have a number of
votes equal to the number of its member states which are WTO mem-
bers (Article IX:1). The requirements for majority voting differ de-
pending on whether decisions are taken e.g., by the Ministerial
Conference and the General Council (Article IX:1), and whether they
concern "interpretations of this Agreement and of the Multilateral
Trade Agreements" (Article IX:2), "waivers" (Article IX:3-5), amend-
ments (Article X), accessions (Article XII) or the WTO dispute settle-
ment mechanism.
Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement stipulates that "(e)ach
member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and ad-
ministrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the an-
nexed Agreements." The similar provisions in the Tokyo Round
Agreements were generally construed to require the adoption of laws,
regulations and procedures that enable contracting parties to act in
conformity with their obligations under these agreements, without
necessarily requiring them to do so. The reason for this interpretation
is the fact that the trade laws of most countries apply also to non-
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member countries of GATT and the WTO, and authorize govern-
ments to deviate from their GATT obligations e.g., in relation with
third countries. Several GATT dispute settlement panels concluded
that only legislation mandatorily requiring governments to act incon-
sistently with their GAT obligations amounts to a violation of
GATT, regardless of whether or not the provision had already been
applied in a concrete case or was only capable of creating future trade
distortions; but "legislation merely giving those executive authorities
the power to act inconsistently with the General Agreement is not, in
itself, inconsistent with the General Agreement,"73 as long as it is ap-
plied in a manner consistent with the GAT obligations of the govern-
ment concerned. The same interpretation is likely to prevail with
regard to the WTO obligations to ensure the conformity of domestic
laws and regulations with WTO law.
The WTO's Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) is
designed:
to contribute to improved adherence by all Members to rules, disci-
plines and commitments made under the Multilateral Trade Agreements
and, where applicable, the Plurilateral Trade Agreements, and hence to
the smoother functioning of the multilateral trading system, by achieving
greater transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies and
practices of Members. Accordingly, the review mechanism enables the
regular collective appreciation and evaluation of the full range of indi-
vidual Members' trade policies and practices and their impact on the
functioning of the multilateral trading system. It is not, however, in-
tended to serve as a basis for the enforcement of specific obligations
under the Agreements or for dispute settlement procedures, or to im-
pose new policy commitments on Members. 74
The periodic reviews of the foreign economic policies of all WTO
member countries, and the publication of the various reports and dis-
cussions, have greatly enhanced the transparency of the multilateral
trading system and the peer pressure on compliance with GAIT/
WTO rules. This "preventive diplomacy" and "conflict avoidance
strategy" supplements the WTO rules for the mandatory settlement of
disputes once they have arisen.
73 United States-Panel Report on Imports of Tuna, GATT B.I.S.D. 39th Supp., 155, 197
(1992); United States-Panel Report on Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances,
GATT B.I.S.D. 34th Supp., 136, 163 (adopted June 17, 1987).
74 See Annex 3 of the WTO Agreement, section A (i), in REsuLTs OF THE URUGUAY
RoUND, supra note 69, at 434.
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VII. THE WTO AGREEMENT AND WTO DIsPuTE SETTLEMENT
SYSTEM AS MODELS FOR REFORMING OTHER
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS?
What can we learn from the constitutional functions and constitu-
tional principles of the WTO Agreement, and notably from its com-
pulsory worldwide dispute settlement system, for the task of
"constitutionalizing" the UN and other international organizations?
Could the GATT and WTO strategies for overcoming the prisoners'
dilemma in the field of global economic cooperation, where they ena-
bled a worldwide "functional integration" with progressive "spill-
overs" into additional areas of cooperation, also be applied in the
power-oriented realm of foreign "high politics" in the UN?75 Are
there parallels between the constitutional needs of a liberal interna-
tional trade order and those of a liberal international political order?
Are the functional interrelationships between international and do-
mestic legal guarantees of "market freedoms" and non-discrimination
in the international trade order (e.g., in WTO law, EC law and domes-
tic trade laws), which have been crucial for actually achieving the
GATT-, WTO- and EC Treaty objectives of liberal trade, also impor-
tant for achieving the UN objective of "democratic liberal peace?"
What can we learn from the international WTO guarantees of individ-
ual rights (e.g., intellectual property rights), and from their
(quasi)judicial protection at the national and international level, for
achieving more effectively the UN objective of protection of human
rights?
A. The Uruguay Round: A Model for Reforming the UN System?
There is today worldwide agreement that many chapters of the
1945 UN Charter have become outdated (e.g., chapters XI to XIII on
non-self-governing territories and the trusteeship system). There is
also widespread concern at the fact that less than a third of the UN
member countries, and only one of the five permanent members of
the UN Security Council, have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) pursuant to Article 36:2 of
the Statute of the ICJ. As in the case of GATI' 1947, the basic princi-
ples of the UN Charter need to be adapted to the vastly altered cir-
cumstances of the modern globally integrated world where
decolonization has been achieved and - with the waning of the East-
75 For a discussion of the various "realist theories," "rdgime theories," "(neo)functional the-
ories," "public choice" and "constitutional theories" of international relations, see Petersmann,
supra note 5, at 182-221.
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West and North-South divides - human rights have become univer-
sally recognized principles of customary international law. The in-
creasing number of proposals for procedural and institutional reforms
(e.g., of the UN Security Council) reveal, however, a troubling paucity.
of theory (e.g., on how to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the
UN and prevent non-democratic UN members from blocking UN re-
forms focusing on "democratic peace").76 In the U.S. Congress, pro-
posals for a U.S. ultimatum to the UN ("Reform or Die") are
increasingly discussed, and legislation has been introduced under
which the United States would withdraw, from the UN, which would
be replaced by a league of democracies.77
Governments should therefore examine whether the successful
Uruguay Round negotiations could serve as a model for reforming the
UN system. For example, should a limited number of OECD coun-
tries take the initiative by announcing their intention to negotiate a
new UN Charter and withdraw from the 1945 UN Charter within a
few years (similar to the termination of GAIT 1947 after a transi-
tional period of coexistence of the old GAT 1947 and the new
WTO)? Should they insist on linking such a new UN Charter with
UN human rights conventions (similar to the linkage of the WTO
Agreement with the intellectual property rights conventions) so as to
reduce free riding and non-cooperation in securing democratic peace?
Should, similar to I. Kant's proposals for a draft treaty on "Perpetual
Peace," a new UN Charter be limited to constitutional democracies
which promote human rights, rule of law and peaceful conffict resolu-
tion? Could the compulsory WTO dispute settlement system serve as
a model for a mandatory global jurisdiction of the ICJ? Should a re-
vised UN system broaden the "cross-retaliation powers" of the UN
Security Council and of the World Bank Group vis-A-vis non-democ-
racies (similar to the "cross-retaliation" that may be authorized by the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body in response to persistent violations of
WTO law)? Could the full WTO membership of the EC serve as a
precedent for a UN membership and IMF membership of regional
unions like the EC? Could GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V
76 For a recent survey of such proposals for reforming the UN system see Knight, supra note
59, at 229-53.
77 Cf. Jesse Helms (chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee), A U.S. Ultimatum
for the U.N.: Reform or Die, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1996. "The time has come for the U.S. to
deliver an ultimatum: Either the U.N. reforms, quickly and dramatically, or the U.S. will end its
participation. For too long the Clinton administration has paid lip service to the idea of U.N.
reform without imposing any real costs for its absence. Without the threat of American with-
drawal, nothing will change." Id.
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serve as models for worldwide legal disciplines on regional integration
agreements (e.g., for coordinating worldwide and regional human
rights protection)?
Constitutional theory suggests that the legitimacy of any compre-
hensive reform of the UN depends on the strengthening of its human
rights guarantees and of democracy, which is nothing else than the
institutional consequence of effective human rights.78 Empirical polit-
ical studies confirm that democratic peace is much more likely among
democracies which, as I. Kant predicted, have only very rarely initi-
ated aggression against other democracies.79 Constitutional theory
further demonstrates, and GATT and EC experience confirms it, that
the effectiveness of international rules depends on supplementary dis-
pute settlement and enforcement mechanisms (like the WTO's Trade
Policy Review Mechanism and dispute settlement system). The long
and often unsuccessful series of attempts at administrative, financial
and institutional piecemeal reforms of the UN illustrates the advan-
tages of the WTO approach of replacing the old GATT 1947 by a new
WTO Agreement. EC law, as well as the increasing protection of in-
dividual rights and access to domestic courts in WTO law, underline
the need for protecting the rights of "we the people." Discretionary
regulatory powers at the international level require no less constitu-
tional safeguards than at the national level in order to limit abuses of
national and international bureaucracies.
The transformation of Europe by means of EC law, and by the
network of association agreements between the EC and most other
European states, illustrates that economic integration law has moved
to the centre of foreign policy-making and democratic peace in Eu-
rope. General international lawyers - who sometimes justify their dis-
regard of international economic law by discounting it as an allegedly
78 See, e.g., Article 21 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "(1) Everyone
has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives.... (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of governments;
this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures." G.A.
Res. 217A, U.N. Doe. A/810, at 71 (1948). While the word denrocracy does not appear in the
UN Charter, the latter begins with the opening words "We the peoples of the United Nations."
For the reasons described by constitutional theory, democracy is one of the pillars on which
peaceful international cooperation must be built in order to reduce the inherent instability of the
power- and state-centered Westphalian system.
79 Empirical evidence confirms not only that democracies are less likely to use military force
against other democracies but also that "democracies play the game of 'tit-for-tat' with non-
democracies. They rarely initiate conflict, but retaliate when provoked. It is also notable that
... democracies tend to win their wars." M. Wolf, Richard Cobden and the Democratic Peace 9
(1996) (mimeo on file with author).
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"immature specialization" - risk becoming "immature generalists" if
they fail to take into account that the WTO Agreement is likely to
become "the key to the promotion and reinforcement of democracy
and democratic institutions in the decades to come."" ° Its substantive
guarantees of freedom, non-discriminatory competition and rule of
law, as well as its institutional "checks and balances" and compulsory
dispute settlement system, are in many respects more developed and
,more ambitious than those of other worldwide organizations. The op-
portunities for strengthening a liberal international order, based on
constitutionalism and democracy, need to be grasped. The challenges
to democracy from international integration - such as the steady in-
crease in the transnational exercise of individual rights, and in regula-
tion at the international level rather than within nation-states - require
strengthening democratic decision-making and human rights also at
the domestic level so as to protect the equal rights and self-determina-
tion of the citizens from being undermined by international
integration.
B. Proliferation and Need for Reforms of International Dispute
Settlement Mechanisms
The post-war developments in international treaty practice - no-
tably the trends towards multilateral treaties, worldwide and regional
organizations and integration treaties of direct relevance for private
citizens - have also led to a significant increase in the number of in-
ternational dispute resolution bodies. Like the development of inter-
national organizations, this proliferation of international adjudicatory
bodies evolved on a pragmatic trial and error basis. For instance, the
courts, commissions and committees set up under the various African,
Inter-American, European and worldwide human rights conventions
differ from one another considerably, notwithstanding their often
overlapping jurisdiction for the interpretation of human rights guaran-
tees. They also do not provide for procedures to promote the mutual
consistency of their interpretation and application. The International
Court of Justice (ICJ), as "the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations" (Article 92 of the UN Charter), also has jurisdiction for the
general and conventional human rights guarantees of international
law. The ICJ's case law on human rights, however, - apart from clari-
80 Peter Sutherland, Global Trade - The Next Challenge, 49 AUSSENWiRTSCHAFrT [Swiss REV.
INT'L ECON. REL-] 7, 8 (1994). On the U.S. - and sometimes EC - leadership in the Uruguay
Round negotiations see also JARROD WIENER, MAKING RULES IN THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
TmE GATT: A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LEADERSmP (1995).
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fying the general international law rules on diplomatic protection and
the UN Charter obligations in the human fights field, including obliga-
tions erga omnes - has remained very limited.81 There are no rules
similar to the appellate review in the WTO, which could ensure unity
of interpretation of international law by the various international
courts, apart from the possibility of appeals from the judgments of the
Administrative Tribunals of the UN and the ILO by requesting an
advisory opinion from the ICJ.82 Due to the preference of govern-
ments to provide for special treaty interpretation procedures and sep-
arate dispute settlement mechanisms in the context of multilateral
treaties, rather than for recourse to the ICJ, the ICJ plays a minor part
in most areas of modern multilateral treaty law. Moreover, by permit-
ting only states to have access to the contentious jurisdiction of the
ICJ, the Statute of the ICJ continues to ignore the structural changes
in the state-centered "Westphalian international legal order" over the
past decades, such as the important role of individuals, private enter-
prises and international organizations in promoting voluntary and
peaceful international cooperation.
Similar to the dispute settlement practice in GATT and the
WTO, where recourse to arbitration has been rare, traditional ad hoc
arbitration among states has markedly declined since World War II:
notwithstanding the tripling of the number of sovereign states since
1945, there were only 43 arbitrations during the period 1945-1990,
compared to 178 inter-state arbitrations between 1900-1945. Only two
cases were submitted to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The
Hague after 1945, compared with 23 cases during the first half of this
century.83 The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the United
81 See generally S.M. Schwebel, The Treatment of human rights and of aliens in the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, in Furry YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JusTiCE 327, 329-44
(Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996) (examining the Court's role in the sphere of
international human rights); Tim INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTiCE 1946-1996, 358 (Arthur
Eyffinger ed., 1996) ("no cases have been dealt with by the Court which solely or mainly con-
cerned questions of human rights.").
82 See generally Georges Abi-Saab, The International Court as a World Court, in Furry
YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note 81, at 13-14 (noting that the
appeals from the judgments of the administrative tribunals of the UN and the ILO through
requested advisory opinions "push the situation forwards towards the progressive emergence of
an international judicial or adjudicative system.").
83 For details see William E. Butler, The Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration, in INTERNA-
TIONAL COURTS FOR TmE TwENTY-FIRsT CENTURY 43-53 (Mark W. Janis ed., 1992) (examining
the structure of the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration); Christine Gray & Benedict Kings-
bury, Inter-State Arbitration since 1945: Overview and Evaluation, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS
FOR THE TwENTY-FIzsT CENTURY 43-84 (Mark W. Janis ed., 1992) (examining inter-state arbi-
tration attempts since 1945). The 95th annual report of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on
its activities in 1995 refers, however, to a large number of proceedings initiated pursuant to the
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Nations Compensation Commission for Iraq have, however, given rise
to a large number of arbitration awards dealing with special crisis
situations.
The Statute of the ICI has been adjusted so as to render recourse
to it more flexibly and easily. Thus, the encouragement of the cham-
bers procedures in the ICJ's 1978 "Rules of Court" has reduced the
substantive differences between arbitration and judicial settlement
(e.g., by enabling party control over the composition of the tribunal);
this has prompted increasing recourse to ad hoc chambers of the ICJ
rather than to the full Court of 15 or more judges. The UN Trust
Fund created in 1989 has assisted states in the settlement of disputes
through the ICJ by reducing the financial burden of court proceedings
(such as the costs of legal counsel, secretariat assistance, accommoda-
tion and translation) and of executing Court judgments (see, e.g., the
financial assistance granted for the marking out of the adjudged
boundary in the frontier dispute case between Burkina Faso and
Mali). The increase in UN membership to 185 states, and improve-
ments in the internal judicial practice of the ICJ, have contributed to
an increase in the number of cases before the Court since the late
1980s.
Yet, more fundamental reforms remain necessary if the ICJ is
ever to become a true "supreme court" of the world community. For
example, the fact that "only States may be parties in cases before the
Court" (Article 34 Statute of the ICJ) implies that international dis-
putes involving international organizations or private individuals are
likely to be settled outside the IC. The only 58 (1995) acceptances of
"compulsory" jurisdiction under Article 36:2 of the Statute, and the
many reservations to these declarations, reflect a continuing distrust
on the part of many states in adjudication by the ICJ. 4 The lengthy
written and oral proceedings (with occasionally more than 50 public
sittings in a single case), court deliberations among 15 or more judges
and sometimes excessively long judgments and separate opinions (to-
talling not infrequently several hundred pages) continue to be criti-
cized as too time-consuming and inefficient.85 The limited jurisdiction
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules for disputes between a state party and foreign enterprises, in
which the International Bureau of the Court was involved.
84 See generally MICHLA POMERANCE, TmE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD COURT AS A
SUPREME COURT OF THE NAnONs: DREAMs, ILLUSIONS AND DIsILLUSION (1996).
85 See, e.g., Robert Y. Jennings, The International Court of Justice after Fifty Years, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 493,497-505 (1995) (suggesting that oral pleadings be shorter and that separate opinions
and dissents be "made as economical as may be" to alleviate a growing docket in the Interna-
tional Court).
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of the ICJ for the review of the legality of actions by UN organs, the
infrequent recourse to the advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ and the crit-
icism of the ICJ's appellate review function for questions arising from
decisions of the UN and ILO Administrative Tribunals, further illus-
trate the limits of the ICJ as a constitutional and administrative court
of the UN system. 6 While formal amendments of the Statute of the
Court, which is an integral part of the UN Charter, will be difficult to
achieve, a recent study group report on the procedures and working
methods of the ICJ rightly concluded that many needed reforms could
be made through changes in the judicial practices within the existing
rules, through UN resolutions, or through an optional agreement to
which only some states would be party and which would bind only
themselves in their relations with the Court.'
An increasing number of worldwide and regional organizations
provide for their own dispute settlement mechanisms. Examples in-
clude the ad hoc international criminal tribunals and the UN Compen-
sation Commission concerning Iraq established by the UN Security
Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; the Law of the Sea
Tribunal and arbitration procedures provided for in the 1982 Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea; the new WTO dispute settlement system;
the various dispute settlement mechanisms in UN Specialized Agen-
cies (like the International Labour Organization, the World Bank
Group, the International Telecommunications Union, the Universal
Postal Union); and the judicial and arbitral mechanisms in American
and European regional integration (e.g., in the EC, European Con-
vention on Human Rights, Organization for Security and Cooperation
86 See, eg., Lucius Caflisch, Is the International Court Entitled to Review Security Council
Resolutions Adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter?, in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES
ARISING UNDER THm UNITED NATIONS DECADE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 633, 660-61 (Najeeb
AI-Nauimi & Richard Meese eds., 1995) (arguing that the Court's under-used appellate review
function cannot be extended and that the court cannot challenge the legality of the Council's
Chapter VII decisions in the framework of contentious proceedings); Vera Gowlland-Debbas,
The Relationship between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council in the Light
of the Lockerbie Case, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 643 (1994) (using the Lockerbie case as a point of
departure to discuss the relationship between the ICJ and the Security Council); P. Pescatore,
Two Tribunals and One Court - Some Current Problems of International Staff Administration in
the Jurisdiction of the ILO and UN Administrative Tribunals and the International Court of Jus-
tice, in TowARDS MORE EFFEcnvE SUPERVISION BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 217-238
(N. Blokker & S. Muller eds., 1994).
87 See generally The International Court of Justice: Efficiency of Procedures and Working
Methods: Report of a Study Group, in INT'L & Comp. L. Q. SUPPLEMENT (January 1996).
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in Europe, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the North
American Free Trade Agreement).88
International agreements enabling direct access by private trad-
ers, producers, investors, employers, employees or other private citi-
zens to international dispute settlement bodies are increasingly
accepted by states. Examples include the International Labour Or-
ganization (ILO) system of complaints and various human rights con-
ventions; the arbitration mechanism of the International Center for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID); the dispute settle-
ment mechanisms provided for in the Convention Establishing the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA); the 1982 Law of
the Sea Convention; the 1994 WTO Agreement on Pre-Shipment In-
spection; EC law and the 1995 Protocol amending the European So-
cial Charter; and the Canada-United States Free Trade Agteement
and the North American Free Trade Agreement.
Courts,'arbitration and voluntary recourse to "alternative meth-
ods of dispute settlement" (such as mediation and conciliation) have
become the principal means of dispute settlement within constitu-
tional democracies. 89 But even those states which accept judicial con-
trol over national legislation and executive acts in their domestic
constitutional systems, often continue to be unwilling to accept
mandatory international judicial review of their foreign policy meas-
ures and of the rule of law in international relations. For instance,
among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, only
the United Kingdom currently accepts the mandatory jurisdiction of
the ICJ. In international organizations other than the EC and the
Council of Europe, the compulsory jurisdiction of courts and arbitra-
tion bodies continues to be the exception rather than the rule. Thus,
neither the UN Charter nor the IMF Agreement, the World Bank
Agreement, the GAT? 1947 nor the WTO Agreement provide for ju-
dicial review over the validity of law-making acts by these organiza-
tions.9° The former president of the ICJ even recently held that "it
would be unreasonable to look to the International Court of Justice,
with its present structure, organization and mode of functioning, for
88 See Implications of the Proliferation of International Adjudicatory Bodies for Dispute Res-
olution, AM. Soc'Y INT'L L BuLL. No. 9 (November 1995).
89 See, eg., STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DisrpurE REsOLUTnON (1985) (providing an over-
view of these different methods of dispute settlement at the national level).
90 See Geoffrey R. Watson, Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the World Court, 34
HAv. INT'L L. J. (1993) (on the limited power of the ICJ to review the validity of acts by the
Security Council and the General Assembly).
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an adequate control of the legality of the acts of international
organs." 91 *
And even where international adjudication has been accepted by
states, compliance with judgments of international courts can present
many problems. 92 The experience of both EC law and the European
Convention on Human Rights clearly suggests that cooperation be-
tween international and national courts, and the right of individuals to
invoke the international obligations of governments before the na-
tional judiciary, are of crucial importance for rendering international
law more effective within domestic legal systems. Such a strengthen-
ing of national and international adjudication, and of the correspond-
ing rights of domestic citizens, raises numerous other constitutional
and judicial problems, as illustrated by the diversity of national and
international court procedures and standards of review in the field of
foreign trade law (cf. Table 6).93
C. The WTO Dispute Settlement System as a Model?
During the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations,
one of the reasons for negotiating worldwide rules on trade in serv-
ices, intellectual property rights and trade-related investments in the
GATT context was the widely held view among governments that the
availability of the GAIT dispute settlement system for enforcing the
GATS, TRIMS and TRIPS Agreements would render these new rules
more effective. The goal of further extending the availability and ju-
risdiction of the WTO dispute settlement system also appears to influ-
ence some of the recent proposals to negotiate additional investment,
competition, environmental, social and labour rules in the context of
the WTO. Why do many governments view the GATT/WTO dispute
settlement system as a model for enforcing international economic
rules?
91 M. Bedjaoui, On the Efficacy of International Organizations, in TOWARDS MORE EFvsc-
TIVE SUPERVISION BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 86, at 25.
92 In his concluding remarks to this book, H.G. Schermers finds, however, that "compliance
is reasonably good, not worse than compliance with the judgments of domestic courts." Henry
G. Schermers, Evaluation, in COMPLIANcE WITH JUDGMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 133
(Mielle K. Bulterman & Martin Kuijer eds., 1996).
93 See generally Table 6. For a more detailed discussion of the problems illustrated in Table
6, see also ERNsT-ULCH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETrLEMENT SYSTEM: IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (1997);
ELInu LAUTERPACHT, AsPEcrs OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (1991);
BENEDETTO CONFORTI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ROLE OF DOMEST=C LEGAL SYSTEMS
(1993).
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Table 6: Judicial Review of Foreign Trade Regulations
Level of Review I Powers and Standards of Review Policy Problems of Review
(1) National courts applying
national law (e.g., Article X
GAT)




applying national law at the
request of private parties
(e.g., Chapter 19 NAFTA)
(4) International courts
applying international law
at the request of private
parties (e.g., Chapter 11
NAFTA, ICSID, Article





20 NAFTA, Article 173
EC, Article XXIII GAIT,
Article XXIII GATS)
(1) Compliance with procedures
(2) Accurate determination of
facts
(3) Manifest error of appraisal
of the facts
(4) Misuse of discretionary
powers
(5) Adequate reasoning of the
regulation










b) for foreign policy
reasons?




a) for domestic policy
reasons? (e.g., protection
of international freedoms
as individual rights in EC
and ECHR)
b) for foreign policy
reasons? (e.g., "democratic




a) for domestic policy
reasons? (e.g., "strict




b) for foreign policy
reasons?
(e.g., stricter ECJ review
of national trade measures




In most international organizations other than the GATT 1947
and the WTO, states have been reluctant to initiate dispute settlement
proceedings against other states. This is often due to the nature of the
international rules concerned. The small number of intergovernmen-
tal complaints among states in human rights conventions, for example,
seems to be related to the fact that human rights violations are, from a
diplomatic perspective, often viewed as a "domestic policy problem"
which should be left primarily to complaints by the directly affected
citizens. The various procedures for "representations" and "com-
plaints" by governments, non-governmental organizations and indi-
viduals pursuant to Articles 24-26 of the Constitution of the ILO
relate likewise to essentially domestic conflicts (e.g., between trade
unions, employer organizations and governments) over the consis-
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tency of national social and labour laws with ILO Agreements and
ILO Recommendations. They rely primarily on political methods of
dispute settlement without legally binding determinations. The possi-
bility of submitting, pursuant to Article 31 of the ILO Constitution,
complaints and other disputes to the ICJ has so far never been used.94
Many sectoral international organizations, like the International
Civil Aviation Organization and the International Telecommunica-
tions Union, have traditionally focused on the harmonization of laws
(e.g., regarding air safety, international coordination and allocation of
radio and television frequencies) rather than on multilateral liberali-
zation of market access barriers, such as national monopolies (e.g., of
national airlines, postal, radio and television monopolies).95 Some
governments therefore view neither these organizations nor their dis-
pute settlement mechanisms as appropriate frameworks for negotiat-
ing and enforcing liberal international trade rules. The substantive
standards, dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms of the
World Intellectual Property Organization have likewise been criti-
cized as inadequate by many countries. The proposals, made by the
WIPO Secretariat after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments, to supplement the WTO dispute settlement system by a WIPO
"Treaty on the Settlement of Disputes between States in the Field of
Intellectual Property" have so far been opposed, notably by the
United States.
The several hundred invocations by GATT member countries of
the dispute settlement provisions in GATT Articles XXII and XXIII,
as well as in the various 1979 Tokyo Round Agreements and 1994
Uruguay Round Agreements, confirm the practical experience in fed-
eral states, free trade areas (like the NAFTA) and customs unions
(like the EC) that liberal trade rules are well suited for judicial inter-
pretation and enforcement at the request of traders or trading coun-
tries. The more than 50 invocations of the WTO dispute settlement
system during the first 20 months after its entry into force on 1 Janu-
94 But the ILO actively promotes the submission of labour disputes to private arbitration.
See ALAN GLADSTONE, VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION OF INTEREST DISPUTES: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE, (1984); GRIEVANCE ARBrIRATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (1989). On the ILO as a "stan-
dard-setting" organization, which had adopted 174 ILO Conventions and 181 ILO Recommen-
dations by 1993 and on the various supervision and complaints procedures in the context of the
ILO, see N. Valticos, Once More About the ILO System of Supervision: In What Respect is it still
a Model?, in TOvARDS MORE EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
supra note 86, at 99-113.
95 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Liberalization of International Air Transport Services
through the GATS?, in PERSPECTVES OF Am LAW, SPACE LAW AND INTERNATIONAL BusrIEss
LAW FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 175-90 (K.H. B6ckstiegel ed., 1996).
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ary 1995 suggest that the WTO Agreement will continue and reinforce
this longtime trend towards "legalization" and "judicialization" of dis-
pute settlement in international trade law. It is noteworthy in this re-
spect that both the EC and the United States, in their domestic
implementing legislation for the Uruguay Round Agreements, have
extended the rights of private traders and producers to request the
initiation of WTO dispute settlement proceedings. The GATT dispute
settlement system has also acquired a good reputation regarding the
implementation of the roughly 130 dispute settlement reports within a
reasonable period of time. In the several hundred bilateral interna-
tional investment protection agreements, and in international finan-
cial organizations such as the World Bank and the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency, international court or arbitration pro-
cedures are likewise regularly provided for the protection of the prop-
erty rights of private lenders and foreign investors.96
The national and international legal guarantees of economic free-
dom, non-discrimination and rule of law, such as those in GAT/
WTO law, have not only extended, for the benefit of individual citi-
zens and consumers, liberal constitutional principles to the ever more
important area of economic policy-making of governments and to the
transnational economic activities of citizens. The mutually beneficial
character of liberal trade, and the consistent legal and economic ra-
tionality of liberal economic rules, have also enabled the emergence of
a highly developed case law on a worldwide, regional and national
level (e.g., in GATT, the EC and federal states). As international re-
lations are increasingly determined by economic relations, this change
from power-oriented "diplomatic" to rule-oriented "legal" methods of
foreign policy-making and dispute settlement, and the worldwide ac-
ceptance of a compulsory dispute settlement system as part of the
WTO Agreement, are an important new development in international
law. Due to the fact that the regional law of free trade areas (such as
NAFTA) and customs unions (such as the EC) is based on, and
strongly influenced by, the worldwide GATT and WTO rules (e.g.,
Article XXIV), the worldwide and regional dispute settlement prac-
tices reveal many parallels and offer a fascinating field for compara-
tive analyses.
The main conclusion of this article goes, however, far beyond the
realm of international trade law. For, the Uruguay Round negotia-
96 For a survey see R. Dolzer, Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in the IMF, the World Bank
and MIGA, in ADJUDICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DIspUTEs IN INTERNATIONAL AND
NATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 139-58 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Gunther Jaenicke eds., 1992).
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tions, the WTO Agreement and the WTO dispute settlement system
appear to offer a number of important lessons also for future reforms
of the UN Charter and of other dispute settlement mechanisms. For
instance:
- The objectives of rendering the UN Charter and the ICJ more effec-
tive may be easier to achieve through the negotiation of a new UN Char-
ter with more effective human rights guarantees and compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ, even if initially limited to a number of like-
minded constitutional democracies and co-existing with the 1945 UN
Charter during a transitional period (on the model of the temporary co-
existence of the GATr 1947 and the WTO), than through amending the
existing UN Charter pursuant to its Article 108.
- As in the case of the Uruguay Round negotiations, such a new UN
Charter for the 21st century will not come about without strong leader-
ship by the United States and the EU and without comprehensive pack-
age deal negotiations.
- As in respect of the old GAIT 1947, the 1945 UN Charter could
coexist with a new Charter during a transitional period so as avoid a
disruption of international legal relations with those countries (notably
non-democracies) which might not join the new agreement right from
the beginning.
- As in the case of the WTO Agreement, the advantages of a new UN
system (such as access to the World Bank Group, membership in UN
conventions) might have to be limited, at least in part, to members of the
"new UN" so as to set strong incentives for strengthening human rights,
democracy, and for joining the new organization.
- The new UN Charter should provide for an integrated and compul-
sory dispute settlement system applicable to all covered agreements. It
should combine the various political and legal methods of international
dispute settlement and also strengthen judicial protection of individual
rights at the national level.
